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INTRODUCTION
"Just as the Commissioner in determining income tax liabili-
ties may look through the form of a transaction to its substance,
so, as a general rule, may he bind a taxpayer to the form in which
the taxpayer has cast a transaction."1
"The taxpayer as well as the Government is entitled to the
benefit of the rule that the substance rather than the form of a
transaction controls.",
2
The principle that the government alone may appeal to the sub-
stance of a transaction pervades federal tax law. Every taxpayer
seeking to disavow the form of a transaction must consider the pos-
sibility that substance arguments create a one-way street in favor of
the government. This "one-way rule" emerges in transactions
as diverse as intercompany transfers, corporate mergers, sale-
leasebacks, and divorce settlements.
Despite its pervasiveness, the one-way rule4 is in apparent disar-
ray.' Courts are deeply divided over whether an appeal to sub-
stance should receive a different reception depending on whether
the taxpayer or the government makes it.6 In one sense, making the
I Spector v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 376, 381 (5th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981).
2 Ciaio v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 447, 457 (1967).
3 For general surveys of this principle, see 1 B. BITrKER & L. LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs 3.6, 4.4.6 (2d ed. 1989) (discussion of
disavowal of form by taxpayers and attempts by taxpayers to restructure transactions);
Burstein, The Impact of Form, and Disavowing Form, on the Characterization of Sales
Transactions, 66 TAXES 220 (1988). For articles describing situations in which the
principle did not apply, see Donaldson, When Substance-Over-Form Argument is A vail-
able to the Taxpayer, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 41 (1964); Rosen, Substance Over Form - A
Taxpayer's Weapon, 22 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 689 (1970); Smith, Substance and Form: A
Taxpayer's Right to Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAX LAW. 137 (1990).
4 In this Article the "one-way rule" refers loosely to the rule binding the taxpayer to
the form of the transaction for tax purposes. More precisely, the rule grants less weight
to taxpayer appeals to substance than to those made by the government. On occasion,
the term refers to assymetrical rules that tend to disadvantage the taxpayer. See I.R.C.
§§ 267, 1091, 1251 (1991).
5 See Rosen, supra note 3, at 742-43 ("[I]t is impossible to deduce specific universally
applicable legal principles which will provide a relatively automatic answer in situations
where the taxpayer desires to invoke substance as a defense against imposition of a tax
liability based on the form of his own transaction."); Donaldson, supra note 3, at 45
(describing taxpayer's right to argue against form as "a rough and unmarked road").
6 For cases adopting the one-way rule, see Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehy-
drating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134 (1974); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940);
Schatten v. United States, 746 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1984); Commissioner v. Danielson,
378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967); Television Indus., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960); Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d
Cir. 1959); United States v. Morris & Essex R.R., 135 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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weight given an argument dependent on its source, or pedigree, de-
nies even-handed application of the law.7 In another sense, an
asymmetrical approach balances the advantage adhering in the tax-
payer's control of form.
Confusion over the rule does not stop there. Even courts adopt-
ing a one-way rule differ over its meaning. Some courts forbid the
taxpayer from appealing to substance;8 others allow the taxpayer to
appeal to substance but raise his burden of proof;9 and still others
mention his status as a taxpayer as merely a factor in their deci-
sions.' o Indeed, the rule seems to be a common banner hung over
several very different doctrines. "
This Article endeavors to bring method to this madness by plac-
ing the rule in its broader context and analyzing it historically. This
methodology explains the present status of the rule and suggests
normative considerations for its future application.
Along the way, the Article yields insights that extend into tax
law, administrative law, and statutory interpretation. The one-way
rule is but a thread in a larger legal tapestry. In analyzing the rule,
the Article traces far-reaching historical trends of the last fifty
320 U.S. 754 (1943); Coleman v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 178 (1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d
303 (3d Cir. 1987); Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
For cases rejecting the one-way rule, see Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947);
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Strick Corp. v. United
States, 714 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984); Estate of Wei-
nert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961); Landa v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d
431 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Freeport Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 107 (1974);
Shaw v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 375 (1972).
7 See, e.g., Peerless Steel Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 880, 883
(1967) ("Though there may be some attractive reasons for requiring a taxpayer to ad-
here to the form that he has created, the even-handed application of the law requires us
to allow taxpayers the opportunity to show that their true intent was different from
what was said .... "); Rosen, supra note 3, at 731 ("fairness dictates an even-handed
application of the rule that substance should govern in the field of taxation"); Smith,
supra note 3, at 178-79 (because of its affront to evenhandedness, courts should apply
the one-way rule only in compelling circumstances); Special Committee on Whipsaw,
Final Report, 30 TAX LAW. 127, 133 (1976) (expressing concern for possibility that
government may whipsaw taxpayers).
8 See, e.g., Higgins, 308 U.S. 473.
9 See, e.g., Danielson, 378 F.2d 771; Ullman, 264 F.2d 305.
10 See, e.g., National Alfalfa, 417 U.S. 134; Television Indus, Inc., 284 F.2d 322.
11 Thus, several courts have rejected one form of the rule while adopting another.
See, e.g., Strick Corp. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting a
rule that would escalate the taxpayer's burden of proof in challenging form, but none-
theless binding the taxpayer to form), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984); Peerless Steel,
26 T.C.M. (CCH) at 884 (rejecting a rule that would prevent the taxpayer from re-
nouncing the form of its transaction, but nonetheless requiring the production of strong
proof in order to make such renunciation).
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years: the blurring of sharply drawn boundaries for allocating insti-
tutional authority, the decline of mediating constructs such as statu-
tory purpose and economic reality, and the substitution of
consistent treatment of the entire transaction for precise taxation of
the parties to the transaction in accordance with economic reality.
The Article considers the legal structures underlying in the rule
while suspending judgment on the utility of those structures.1 2 Its
goal is to explain the rule on its own terms. Thus, the Article does
not ask whether the distinctions between strict and liberal construc-
tion, deference and independent judgment, or formal and substan-
tive interpretation logically collapse. Nor does it consider whether
notions such as economic reality have determinant meaning. It asks
instead how courts understand such distinctions and notions. By
using structuralist techniques to analyze public law rules, the Arti-
cle complements prior studies, which have usually focused on pri-
vate law. ' 3
The Article consists of four parts. Part One provides a descrip-
tion that has remained relatively constant over the life of the rule.
By relating the rule to three broader legal choices, the choices be-
tween strict and liberal construction, between independent judg-
ment and agency decisionmaking, and between formal and
substantive interpretation, Part One describes in general terms
when courts use the rule. Additionally, Part One explains the argu-
ments offered for the one-way rule by relating them to the tension
between individualism and communalism.
Part Two places the rule in historical context. It demonstrates
how the general relationship described in Part One evolved over
time. It shows that the rule moved through three identifiable
phases depending on judicial sympathy to tax statutes, how courts
defined their relationship to agencies, and the weight they attached
to consistent treatment of the parties to the transaction.
Part Three describes the present status of the one-way rule.
12 This structuralist approach has roots in anthropology. See generally C. LEvi-
STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1963, 1976); Heller, Structuralism and Cri-
tique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1984).
13 See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 205 (1979); Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975.
For one anticipation of structural analysis in tax law, see Balkin, The Crystalline
Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 41 n.68 (1986) (describing argu-
ments in tax cases as "highly complex combinations of structures created by several
different axes of opposition").
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Viewing the rule as a compromise, it considers the viability of the
rule and divisions within it.
Part Four uses the structures described in the first three Parts to
develop normative principles for applying the rule. Part Four first
develops doctrinal guidelines for adopting the rule and then ana-
lyzes more deeply the policy judgments implicit in it. This analysis
identifies effects of the rule, generates criteria for its application, and
suggests alternatives to it.
PART ONE
A GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ONE-WAY RULE
This Part explains the mixed reaction to the one-way rule. By
putting the rule in its broader legal context, this Part describes in
general terms when courts adopt the one-way rule and how they
justify it.
I
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ONE-WAY RULE TO
BROADER JUDICIAL CHOICES
The adoption of the one-way rule is related to three broader
choices in the law. These choices are broader because they arise not
only when a taxpayer challenges the form of his own transaction,
but also in a wide variety of situations outside tax law.
A. The Choice Between Strict and Liberal Construction
The first choice necessary to understanding the one-way rule is
that between two modes of statutory construction. Traditionally,
courts placed statutes into two categories, in which some, such as
penal statutes, received strict construction, while others, so-called
remedial statutes, received liberal reading to achieve their intended
purposes. "
Each mode has its claim to justice. Strict construction protects
the individual taxpayer from state action. Liberal construction im-
plements the public purpose underlying the statute.
It is difficult to fit tax statutes into this scheme. Specifically, in
doubtful cases, should the Internal Revenue Code (Code) be read
strictly against the Commissioner or liberally in favor of the fisc? In
the early twentieth century, the majority rule was strict construc-
14 See J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 435-520 (1891)
(chapter on strict construction); id. at 521-72 (chapter on liberal construction).
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tion, with a minority of courts favoring liberal construction.15
Later in the century, courts refrained from applying either strict or
liberal construction in favor of "reasonable" 6 or neutral construc-
tion. 7 Neither environment is hospitable to the one-way rule,
which serves only to broaden the scope of tax statutes.
B. The Choice Between Deferring to Agency Interpretation of
Law and Exercising Independent Judgment
The second judicial choice critical to understanding the one-way
rule involves the scope of review given to interpretations of law
made in administrative adjudication. In reviewing the application
of law to facts made in such an adjudication, courts select one of
two alternative modes. 18
Under the mode of independent review, taxpayer and government
arguments receive the same weight. 19 Viewing the action like a pri-
vate lawsuit, the court treats the agency determination no differ-
ently from the position of a private party. Fairness under this mode
dictates that a court consider an argument without respect to its
"pedigree," or source, unless the other party reasonably but detri-
mentally relied on the argument.
The alternate mode, deference to agency position, affords prefer-
ential treatment to the government. Recognizing the public func-
tion served by the agency, the court reviews the agency's disposition
of the case. Fairness under this mode permits consideration of the
argument's pedigree.2°
Each mode has appeal. Independence makes judicial review
meaningful. Deference recognizes the lawmaking function of
agencies.
15 See 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 999 (J. Lewis
2d ed. 1904).
16 See 3A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 66.02 (N.
Singer 4th ed. 1986).
17 See Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should be Nar-
rowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1146 (1943).
An exception has been the maxim favoring strict construction of exceptions to tax stat-
utes. See id. at 1146-47.
18 See, e.g., Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Adminis-
trative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453-54 (1989) (describing "independent judg-
ment" and "deferential" models of the relationship of court and agency); Breyer,
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 365-67 (1986)
(describing opposing judicial attitudes of deference and independence).
19 See Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 559 (1985).
20 See id.
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In administrative law generally, courts divide between these two
modes, although deference is the general rule.2" In tax law, defer-
ence to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) legal positions, if any, is
reserved for interpretations made in regulations and rulings.22
Courts exercise independent judgment on legal and factual issues in
refund suits23 and deficiency actions.24 Thus, the IRS's prior dispo-
sition of the case receives no additional weight in court.2"
This climate generates judicial resistance to the one-way rule.
By leaving the door open to IRS challenges to form on like facts,
the one-way rule shifts decisionmaking from the courts to the IRS.
Although not so formulated, the rule operates as a rule of deference
because it reduces, often to zero, the weight given the taxpayer's
position in a broad array of cases. By escalating the burden of proof
borne by the taxpayer, the one-way rule effectively defers to the
Commissioner's litigating position. Such deference is difficult to
square with settled principles denying special weight to prior IRS
determinations.
C. The Choice Between Formal and Substantive Interpretation
The third judicial choice important to understanding the one-way
rule is that between formal and substantive interpretation. This
choice is implicit whenever a court interprets a contract, statute, or
constitution. It applies to determinations of law and of fact alike.
21 See id. at 598.
22 See I.R.C. § 7805 (1991). For this purpose, "rulings" include only rulings pub-
lished in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. See Mim. 3290, IV-1 C.B. 321 (1925).23 See National Right to Work Legal Defense and Educ. Found., Inc. v. United
States, 487 F. Supp. 801, 805 (E.D.N.C. 1979) ("Mhe factual and legal analysis of the
Commissioner is of no concern to the district court. The court's determination is de
novo.") (citation omitted); Pierson v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Del.
1977) (In an ordinary refund action, "the Court must place itself in the shoes of the
Commissioner.").24 See B. B. Todd, Inc., I B.T.A. 762, 764 (1925) (The Board of Tax Appeals' "duty
[is] to determine from the statute whether the tax asserted by the Commissioner is prop-
erly due."). In another case, the Board of Tax Appeals stated:
It is no part of the duty of this Board, nor has it the right, to decide in any
manner questions of policy in the administration of the office of the Commis-
sioner. It is the duty of this Board to decide appeals filed by taxpayers upon
the facts and the law as applied to their cases.
Cleveland Home Brewing Co., I B.T.A. 87, 91 (1924).
25 The taxpayer, however, bears the burden of proof. T.C.R. 142(a). See United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976) ("In a refund suit the taxpayer bears the bur-
den of proving the amount he is entitled to recover."). Martinez lists many justifica-
tions for the rule. See generally Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric:
Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HAsrINGS L.J. 239 (1988).
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Like the other broader choices, the choice between formal and
substantive interpretation is between competing modes. Formal in-
terpretation looks to the literal language of the text. It conserves
judicial resources, curbs official arbitrariness, and permits private
actors to structure their affairs. A court that is indifferent to the
ultimate result would find formal decisionmaking to be a useful
means of affording private actors certainty in structuring their
affairs. 2
6
In contrast, substantive interpretation departs from the literal
meaning of the text in order to achieve a just outcome. Substantive
decisionmaking avoids the inevitable under- and over-inclusion of
formal rules and permits fine tuning to achieve the correct result on
particular facts. A court concerned about the ultimate result would
choose a substantive approach in order to prevent manipulation of
the rules through the use of form."
Over the long run, courts are unlikely to limit themselves to
either formal or substantive interpretation. Formal decisionmaking
condones injustice in under- or over-inclusive cases and permits ma-
nipulation of the rules. Substantive decisionmaking consumes judi-
cial resources, permits official arbitrariness through unprincipled
recharacterization of transactions, and creates uncertainty for pri-
vate actors.28
The choice between formal and substantive interpretation differs
from that between strict and liberal construction. Admittedly, for-
mal interpretation frequently narrows a statute while substantive in-
terpretation often broadens it. But this effect is not logically
mandated. Depending on the context, formal interpretation can ex-
pand the scope of a statute, and substantive interpretation can nar-
row it. For example, to read an exception for surgery into a statute
prohibiting the "shedding of blood" is to engage in a substantive
interpretation that narrows the statute.
On occasion, courts resolve the difficult choice between formal
and substantive interpretation by resorting to mediating terms that
appear to embody the virtues and exclude the vices of both modes.
In interpreting statutes, courts look for "legislative intent" or "stat-
utory purpose," terms that avoid rigidity while circumscribing judi-
26 See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1688 (1976).
27 See id. at 1689.
28 For further discussion of formal and substantive decisionmaking, see Balkin, supra
note 13, at 43-45; Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1687-1701.
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cial discretion.29 Likewise, in interpreting contracts, focus on the
parties' intent permits courts to avoid woodenness while limiting
their leeway.
In tax law, "economic reality" serves the same mediating func-
tion as "intent" or "statutory purpose." Indeed, in a general sense,
the "purpose" of the Code may be to tax economic reality. By
"economic reality," I mean an objective characterization of a trans-
action that stands independent of its tax consequences. Courts de-
scribe such characterization as "reality" 3° or "substance."31
Although ostensibly a characterization of fact, economic reality also
serves as a basis for determining how the statute will apply.
Reliance on economic reality allows a court to avoid wooden ap-
plication of a statute and rigid adherence to form while restricting
judicial departure from the statute and recharacterization of trans-
actions. Such reliance circumscribes judicial recharacterization and
avoids the under- and over-inclusiveness of formal rules. It pro-
vides a measure of certainty to taxpayers when form is meaningful
and prevents manipulation when form is not.
Economic reality has been the guiding principle in federal taxa-
tion since at least 192132 and has been described as "the cornerstone
of sound taxation."33 Despite this consensus, or perhaps because of
it, there is no single generally accepted definition of economic real-
ity. One possible touchstone is the Haig-Simons definition of per-
sonal income: (1) market rights exercised in consumption plus (2)
the change in the value of property rights.34
Another definition of economic reality looks to the commercial
"norm" for the transaction. This norm may be borrowed from
other bodies of law,3" such as corporate or property law. Alterna-
tively, it can be based on the commercial practice of unrelated per-
sons acting at arm's length, or be derived from assumptions implicit
in the statutory scheme, as when courts add the requirements of
business purpose and continuity of interest to the literal definition of
2 9 See Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance,
6 CARDOZO L. REv. 799, 828-34 (1985).30 See Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 315 (1956).
31 See Campbell v. Fasken, 267 F.2d 792, 796 (5th Cir. 1959).
32 See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921).
33 Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961).
34 H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50, 61-62, 206 (1938).
35 For a striking example of a case deriving economic reality from federal banking
law, see Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394 (1972) (Commissioner's
authority to allocate income among related corporations does not permit allocation of
income that could not have been lawfully received under banking law).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
reorganization.36
Mediating terms sometimes break down. Intent and statutory
purpose become empty concepts. Likewise, economic reality loses
its utility if no independent economic characterization exists, as
when the purpose of a transaction is to allocate tax consequences
(as in many sale-leaseback transactions), or if such reality is difficult
to determine.
When a mediating term breaks down, courts look for other reso-
lutions to the choice between formal and substantive interpretation.
One such resolution looks to the pedigree of the argument, on the
assumption that formal rules ordinarily favor one party over the
other. When the intent of the parties to a contract is unclear, for
example, a court may construe contracts contra proferentem,3
against the preference of the drafter, on the assumption that form
ordinarily benefits the drafter.38
In tax law, the one-way rule serves a mediating function compa-
rable to that performed by contra proferentern. Like contra profer-
entem, the one-way rule imposes formal interpretation on the party
who controls the form and therefore ordinarily benefits from such
interpretation. The taxpayer, as the primary beneficiary of the cer-
tainty and restraint of formal interpretation, can hardly complain of
its application to him. While adopting formal interpretation in the
immediate case, the rule preserves substantive interpretation on is-
sues the Commissioner raises.
D. The Effect of Broader Choices on the One- Way Rule
The choices between deference and independent judgment and
formal and substantive interpretation are generally perceived as in-
dependent. In most situations, the decision to accord deference or
to exercise independent judgment does not affect the choice between
formal and substantive decisionmaking. In situations involving the
36 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (finding the transaction
lacking business purpose outside the reorganization provisions, notwithstanding literal
compliance with the statute); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287
U.S. 462, 470 (1933) (reading into the reorganization provisions a requirement that the
seller acquire a long-term interest in the acquiring business).
3 7 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981); RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(d) (1932); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559
(1960); 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 621 (3d ed.
1961).38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 comment a (1981) (the
drafter is more likely to protect his own interests and to know of uncertainties in
meaning).
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one-way rule, however, the choices become intertwined. The one-
way rule resolves the choice between formal and substantive inter-
pretation so as to defer to the Commissioner's litigating position
and to construe the tax laws liberally.
This interaction explains the mixed reaction to the rule, and situ-
ations in which it is most attractive. The one-way rule repels courts
because, by liberally construing tax statutes and deferring to prior
IRS action, it operates contrary to settled principles. Balancing this
repulsion is the attraction the rule holds as a comfortable resolution
to the choice between formal and substantive interpretation when
economic reality is difficult to determine. The natural resolution of
these competing pulls is that a court will appeal to the rule only
when it feels uncomfortable with economic reality, which is the
traditional solution to the choice between formal and substantive
interpretation. Thus, the rule is most repellant when economic real-
ity is readily ascertainable and most attractive when such reality is
difficult to ascertain.
II
RATIONALES OFFERED FOR THE ONE-WAY RULE
A. The Poles of Individualism and Communalism
The rationales offered for the one-way rule reflect the tension in
the law between individualism and communalism (or altruism),
which constitute competing visions of justice.39 Under the individu-
alist position, moral imperatives are rooted in the free will of the
individual, while under the communalist position, they are based on
the will of the community. Because taxation derives from the will
of the community, the individualist position generally resists impos-
ing taxes, while the communalist position supports it.
These tensions do not coincide directly with the broader doctrinal
choices described above. Nonetheless, each response to those
choices has either an individualistic or communalistic tinge, de-
pending upon its effect on the fisc. Strict construction, independent
judgment, and formal interpretation have an individualistic tone be-
cause they generally limit taxation. In contrast, liberal construc-
tion, deference, and substantive interpretation have a
39 See generally Balkin, supro note 13, at 13-18; Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1713-24.
For examples of individualist and communalist arguments in judicial opinions, see
Balkin, supra note 13, at 78-106.
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communalistic flavor because they usually expand the scope of the
statute.
B. Reliance on Taxpayer Volition and Systemic Utility to Justify
the One-Way Rule
The poles of individualism and communalism explain the argu-
ments offered for the one-way rule. Torn between the two visions of
justice, courts invariably use both individualistic and communalistic
arguments to support the rule. Reliance on both types of arguments
also serves to minimize discomfort regarding the broader choices by
suggesting that the one-way rule is somehow simultaneously consis-
tent with strict and liberal construction, deference and independent
judgment, and formal and substantive interpretation.
One set of arguments appeals to the taxpayer's volition: his elec-
tion, choice, or bargain. This set emphasizes the taxpayer's election
between equally valid tax treatments,"° his choice of form regardless
of the validity of alternative treatments,41 and his bargain with
other parties.42 These arguments are individualistic because they
find the tax liability flowing from the taxpayer's will.
The other set of arguments emphasizes the systemic need for rule:
it prevents tax avoidance, provides certainty, or reduces the possi-
bility that taxpayers will whipsaw the government. 43 This set as-
serts the generalized need to protect the fisc," to have easily applied
rules in judicial decisionmaking,45 or to minimize revenue losses at-
tributable to inconsistent reporting positions taken by unrelated tax-
payers.46 By emphasizing that tax liability flows from the need of
the government, this set alludes to the communalistic position.
PART Two
THE ONE-WAY RULE CONSIDERED HISTORICALLY
The preceding Part presented a static, simplified description of
the one-way rule. This Part enriches that model by placing the rule
in its historical context.
4 See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
43 "The potential for 'Whipsaw' exists whenever two (or more) taxpayers have ad-
verse interests in the manner in which a specific item or transaction is taxed." Special
Committee on Whipsaw, supra note 7, at 127.
44 See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
4 5 See infra notes 201.02 and accompanying text.
46See infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
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Historical analysis confirms that courts most relied on the one-
way rule when economic reality was least ascertainable and that the
rationales offered for the rule allude to both individualistic and
communalistic positions. In addition, such analysis shows that the
formulation and application of the rule varied according to the
resistance to liberal construction, the sharpness in the distinction
drawn between judicial and administrative authority, and the will-
ingness to substitute consistent treatment of the parties to the trans-
action for inquiry into economic reality.
This Part demonstrates that the one-way rule has moved through
three distinct phases, each with a characteristic time period, con-
text, application, and rationale, summarized in Chart One. 7
Although associated with a different time period, each phase none-
theless retains vitality today. The first phase developed in the
1940s, an era in which the boundaries between agency and judicial
decision were sharply demarcated. Courts forbade the taxpayer
from arguing against form in a single, narrowly defined situation in
which economic reality was most lacking: the recognition of gain
or loss on a transfer between a shareholder and a wholly owned
corporation. Elsewhere, courts freely permitted taxpayer appeals to
substance. The articulated rationales for the rule, the taxpayer's
election and the need to prevent tax avoidance, reflected the narrow
application.
In the second phase, most closely identified with the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s, the boundaries between deference and independ-
ent judgment became more fluid. Accordingly, the rule applied in a
broader variety of situations with marginally more economic real-
ity. During this phase, courts applied the rule inconsistently and
with varying weight. Also, the rationales for the rule were broad-
ened to encompass the taxpayer's choice and the systemic need for
certainty.
Finally, in the third phase, emerging in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s, courts substituted transactional consistency for economic re-
ality. As a consequence, the rule received increasing weight in a
growing number of transactions between unrelated parties. Tax-
payers first faced an escalated burden of proof in attacking form,
and later were bound by form absent a showing that the underlying
contract was unenforceable. Originally confined to determining an
allocation of purchase price to a covenant not to compete, these
formulations of the one-way rule extended in the 1980s to other
47 Chart One is located on page 396.
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unrelated-party transactions. The rationales for the rule, enforcing
the parties' bargain and preventing taxpayer whipsaw of the govern-
ment, reflected the loss of faith in an economic reality in unrelated-
party dealings and a growing willingness to look to the transaction
rather than the taxpayer before the court as the appropriate frame
of reference.
The following sections describe the historical backdrop to the
rule and each phase. They focus on case law discussing the one-way
rule,4" but also occasionally discuss statutes and regulations. They
mention but do not dwell upon asymmetrical substantive rules, such
as the limitation on capital losses, that have the effect of a one-way
rule.
I
HISTORICAL BACKDROP
Several long-term historical movements affected the development
of the one-way rule. One such movement was the declining belief in
powers absolute within their spheres. Late nineteenth century ju-
rists viewed the judicial role as defining spheres within which actors
enjoyed complete autonomy and outside of which they held no au-
thority. As the twentieth century progressed, however, boundaries
between spheres became more fluid, with more middle positions.49
The movement away from the idea of powers absolute within
their spheres occurred at different rates in different substantive ar-
eas. The law of personal jurisdiction provides one striking example
of the movement. Late in the nineteenth century, courts saw per-
sonal jurisdiction in on/off terms, as being either present or absent,
depending on the defendant's location."0 In the twentieth century,
however, jurisdiction became an issue of policy as much as power,
as a weighing of interests analysis supplanted rules looking solely to
the defendant's location."'
A parallel development occurred in conflicts of laws. Early in the
48 Therefore, they do not discuss such classics of form-over-substance as Commis-
sioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935), which involved government challenges to form.
49 See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW
13 (D. Kairys ed. 1990).
5 0 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1877) (in personam jurisdiction exists
only if the defendant is present in the forum).
51 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (in personam
jurisdiction exists if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum such
that bringing an action will not offend ideas of "fair play and substantial justice").
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twentieth century, courts chose applicable law by looking to the lo-
cation of the tort, contract, marriage, incorporation, or property. 2
Later in the century, however, courts engaged in interest analysis. 3
A second long-term movement was the severance of tax law from
administrative law. Over the course of the twentieth century, spe-
cialization within the legal profession caused tax law to be regarded
as an independent field. Administrative law texts evidence this sev-
ering. Early twentieth century administrative law casebooks com-
monly devoted considerable attention to taxation. 54 Later works
give taxation less discussion. 55
A third movement was the increasing judicial sympathy to tax
law. Late nineteenth century jurists were commonly hostile to leg-
islation in general,56 and taxation in particular. In the twentieth
52 See, e.g., 2 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1934).
5 3 See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961);
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment c (1971) (reliance of "most significant relationship"
test on factors other than location).54 See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & J. DAVISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 488-520 (2d ed. 1935) (chapter on taxation); E. FREUND, CASES ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 107-37, 557-71 (2d ed. 1928) (chapters on revenue administra-
tion); M. KATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1947) (substan-
tial discussion of IRC and IRS); R. MAURER, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 198-200, 222-26 (1937) (discussion of treasury regulations and
the Board of Tax Appeals); K. SEARS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 313-95 (1938) (chapter on taxation).
55 Income taxation receives scant attention in S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (2d ed. 1985); W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (1960); L. JAFFE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1954); G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCESS (1974); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1984). In
addition, the attention devoted to taxation in one series of texts decreased in successive
editions. Compare C. MCFARLAND & A. VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1048 (1947) (numerous references to "tax administration" in
index) with C. MCFARLAND & A. VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW 873 (2d ed. 1952) (single reference to "tax administration" in index);
compare also W. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1006
(1940) (several references to taxes in index) with W. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1137 (1947) (single reference to taxes in index).
The transition of the Tax Court from an independent agency within the executive
branch to an article I court provides another illustration of tax law's severance from
administrative law during this century. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 1 n.2 (1958).
56 See J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 11-12 (1982); Pound, Common Lawand
Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 386 (1908).
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century, this attitude reversed.57 For example, in 1895, the
Supreme Court struck down the income tax as a prohibited direct
tax,3 8 and twenty-five years later relied upon that prohibition to
exclude a pro rata stock dividend from the definition of income. 9
By mid-century, however, the prohibition on direct taxation ceased
playing a significant role in income tax cases."
The decline of the rule requiring that tax statutes be strictly con-
strued against the government also illustrates the growing judicial
sympathy for taxation.6' Once "founded so firmly ... as not to
admit reasonable doubt,"62 this maxim lost its following over the
twentieth century. 63 The Supreme Court adopted the strict con-
struction rule of tax statutes in 1917, only to repudiate it twenty-one
years later.64
57 See generally Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda In The Ex-
pansion of the Income Tax During World War 11, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 685 (1989).
58 See' Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified, 158 U.S. 601
(1895), overruled, South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
59 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
60 See 1 B. BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 3, at 1-26 ("In later cases, the judici-
ary has bowed to legislative decisions regarding the term 'income,' and the direct tax
clause of the Constitution has never again had the power that was attributed to it by
Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. and Eisner v. Macomber." (citation omitted)).
61 See 1 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.31 (1990)
(describing declining reliance on the rule requiring that courts resolve doubts in tax-
payer's favor).
62 Cahoon v. Coe, 57 N.H. 556, 570 (1876).
63 See 1 B. BITrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 3, 4.3.1.
Successive editions of Sutherland's STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION paid
progressively more attention to alternatives to strict construction. See J. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 462 (1891) (describing only the rule re-
quiring that tax statutes receive narrow construction); 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 999 (J. Lewis 2d ed. 1904) (adding that some courts
require tax statutes be liberally construed); 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION 293-99 (F. Horack ed. 1943) (describing both the general rule
requiring strict construction of statutes and the rule favoring reasonable construction of
statutes); 3A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 66.02
(N. Singer 4th ed. 1986) (expanded and more prominent discussion of the rule requiring
reasonable construction).
64 Compare Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917) ("In case of doubt, [tax stat-
utes] are (to be] construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor of the
[taxpayer].") with White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938) ("We are not im-
pressed by the argument that... all doubts should be resolved in favor of the tax-
payer."). See also Griswold, supra note 17, at 1142-43.
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II
PHASE ONE: THE ONE-WAY RULE GIVEN
CONCLUSIVE WEIGHT BASED ON THEORIES
OF ELECTION AND TAX
AVOIDANCE
During phase one, occurring in the 1940s, courts applied the one-
way rule by referring to sharply demarcated spheres of power. Ac-
cordingly, the one-way rule received preclusive effect in a narrow
set of situations in which economic reality was least discernable.
A. Belief in Powers Absolute Within Their Spheres
In the 1940s, the notion of powers absolute within their spheres
dominated administrative law. Agency authority was viewed in
on/off terms. Under the "delegation" doctrine then prevalent, con-
stitutionally legislative issues simply could not be delegated to agen-
cies.65 Underlying this doctrine was the belief that statutes were
sources of positive law that courts alone could interpret."
The theory of powers absolute within their spheres defined the
relationship between agency and judicial decisionmaking by as-
signing agency and court separate, sharply distinguished realms
over which each held primacy. The weight given an agency deci-
sion was then determined by categorizing the immediate issue at
hand. In the 1940s, courts allocated authority by asking whether
the agency determination fell within the scope of the statute. 67Agency determinations within the scope of the statute received con-
trolling weight if reasonable; those outside the scope of a statute
received no special weight. Two Supreme Court cases described
these realms.
The realm of agency dominance was described in Gray v. Pow-
ell,68 in which the Supreme Court sustained69 the National Bitumi-
65 See, e.g., Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
66 See Diver, supra note 19, at 569; Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1300-05 (1984) (describing formalism in administrative
law and its relationship to the delegation doctrine).
67 Prior to the 1940s, the two realms were issues of fact, over which agencies had
primary responsibility, and issues of law, over which courts exercised independent judg-
ment. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546
n.3 (1965); Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899 (1943);
Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis,
58 HARV. L. REV. 70 (1944).
68 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
69 1d. at 412.
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nous Coal Commission's determination that a leasing arrangement
for producing coal did not make the lessor a "producer," exempt
from the Bituminous Coal Act.7° In so holding, the Court found
that the agency had made a reasonable determination within its ad-
ministrative routine:
In a matter left specifically by Congress to the determination of
an administrative body, . . . the function of review placed upon
the courts... is fully performed when they determine that there
has been a fair hearing, with notice and an opportunity to present
the circumstances and arguments to the decisive body, and an
application of the statute in a just and reasoned manner.
Such a determination as is here involved belongs to the usual
administrative routine. Congress, which could have legislated
specifically as to the individual exemptions from the code, found
it more efficient to delegate that function to those whose experi-
ence in a particular field gave promise of a better informed, more
equitable, adjustment of the conflicting interests of price stabili-
zation upon the one hand and producer consumption upon the
other.
Where, as here, a determination has been left to an administra-
tive body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative
conclusion left untouched. Certainly, a finding on Congressional
reference that an admittedly constitutional act is applicable to a
particular situation does not require such further scrutiny.
... Unless we can say that a set of circumstances deemed by
the Commission to bring them within the concept 'producer' is
so unrelated to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commis-
sion as in effect to deny a sensible exercise of judgment, it is the
Court's duty to leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed.7'
Five years later, in Social Security Board v. Nierotko,72 the
Supreme Court described the realm of judicial primacy. The Court
reversed the Social Security Board's determination that back pay
did not constitute "wages" under the Social Security Act, explain-
ing that such determination was outside the administrative routine
and therefore subject to independent judicial review:
Administrative determinations must have a basis in law and must
be within the granted authority. Administration, when it inter-
prets a statute so as to make it apply to particular circumstances,
70 Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 72 (1937) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 828-852
(1940) (repealed 1966). Section 833(1) of the Act exempted "coal consumed by a pro-
ducer [and] coal transported by the producer to himself for consumption by him."
71 Gray, 314 U.S. at 411-13 (citations omitted); see also NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
72 327 U.S. 358 (1946).
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acts as a delegate to the legislative power. Congress might have
declared that "back pay" awards under the Labor Act should or
should not be treated as wages. Congress might have delegated
to the Social Security Board to determine what compensation
paid by employers to employees should be treated as wages. Ex-
cept as such interpretive power may be included in the agencies'
administrative functions, Congress did neither. An agency may
not finally decide the limits of its statutory power. That is a judi-
cial function.
We conclude, however, that the Board's interpretation of this
statute to exclude back pay goes beyond the boundaries of ad-
ministrative routine and the statutory limits. This is a ruling
which excludes from the ambit of the Social Security Act pay-
ments which we think were included by Congress. It is beyond
the permissible limits of administrative interpretation.73
Likewise, the Supreme Court viewed the one-way rule as creating
sharp distinctions that allocated authority between court and
agency. Indeed, the Court paired Gray and Nierotko with the two
leading one-way rule cases of the period: Higgins v. Smith ,71 which
formulated the rule, and Bartels v. Birmingham," which rejected it.
Read together, these four cases reveal that the Court viewed the
one-way rule as carving out a sharply defined sphere over which the
IRS exercised unfettered authority.
Adoption of the one-way rule was associated with deference to
IRS interpretation. Thus, the Court associated Higgins with Gray.
Gray cited Higgins for the proposition that "[t]he choice of disre-
garding a deliberately chosen arrangement for conducting business
affairs does not lie with the creator of the plan.",76 Furthermore,
Justice Douglas, who in the 1940s was relatively deferential to ad-
ministrative agencies,77 dissented in Bartels and appealed to Gray
as authority for the Higgins one-way rule.
7 3 Id. at 369-70; see also NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 326 (1951)
("[Aln issue of law ... which goes to the heart of the validity of the proceedings on
which the order is based, is open to inquiry by the courts ... .
74 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
75 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
76 Gray, 314 U.S. at 414 (citing Higgins, 308 U.S. at 477).
7 7 See Wolfman, Silver & Silver, The Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax
Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 235, 315-20 (1973) (linking Douglas' views in tax cases with
his attitudes toward administrative agencies).
7 8 Justice Douglas wrote:
I think the tax collector should be entitled to take such private arrange-
ments at their face. In other situations a taxpayer may not escape the tax
consequences of the business arrangements which he makes on the grounds
that they are fictional. The Government may 'sustain or disregard the effect of
[Vol. 70, 19911,
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Conversely, the Court equated rejection of the one-way rule with
the exercise of independent judgment. Accordingly, the Court
paired Bartels, which rejected the rule, with Nierotko and its affir-
mation of independent judgment. In refusing to accede to the IRS's
litigating position, which followed a published ruling,79 the Bartels
Court cited Nierotko and concluded: "We are of the opinion that
such administrative action [the IRS ruling] goes beyond routine and
exceeds the statutory power of the Commissioner.""
B. Preclusive and Consistent Application of the One- Way Rule to
Sales Between Corporation and Shareholder
Viewing the one-way rule as creating a sphere of IRS autonomy
in a system in which such autonomy was generally absent, courts
used the rule sparingly but with great effect. Thus, the rule received
preclusive, consistent application in the limited set of situations in
which economic reality was most doubtful. Elsewhere, it had no
application.
The core case for applying the rule was in characterizing sales
between related corporations. Higgins itself considered whether a
shareholder recognized a loss upon the sale of property to a wholly
owned corporation.81 In concluding that he did not, the Court
needed to distinguish Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co. ,2
which had held that a shareholder recognized gain upon such a sale.
The sole distinction offered by Justice Reed, the author of the opin-
ion, was that in Burnet, the taxpayer challenged the form of the
transaction. 83
the fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax statute.' That rule is not
restricted in its application to the use by taxpayers of corporate or related
devices to obtain tax advantages. It was applied in Gray v. Powell where a
railroad sought exemption from the Bituminous Coal Act by contending that
the operations of one who appeared to be an independent contractor were in
fact its operations. The Court in rejecting the contention said that 'The choice
of disregarding a deliberately chosen arrangement for conducting business af-
fairs does not lie with the creator of the plan.' I see no reason for creating an
exception to that rule here. If the Government chooses to accept the contract
on its face, the parties should be barred from showing that it conceals the real
arrangement. Tax administration should not be so easily embarrassed.
Bartels, 332 U.S. at 133 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Higgins, 308 U.S. at 477; Gray,
314 U.S. at 414).
7 9 See 1944-5-11651, Mim. 5638, 1944 C.B. 547; 1944-22-11889, Mim. 5767, 1944
C.B. 548.
8 0 Bartels, 332 U.S. at 132.
81 Higgins, 308 U.S. 473.
82 287 U.S. 415 (1932).
83 Higgins, 308 U.S. at 477.
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In justifying this holding, Justice Reed emphasized the difficulty
of determining the economic reality of related-party sales. He noted
that because a wholly owned corporation and its shareholder are
ultimately one, the transaction could be regarded as a transfer be-
tween the shareholder's left and right hands.8 4 Alternatively, he ac-
knowledged that because the law generally recognizes a corporation
as separate and apart from its shareholders, the transaction could be
characterized as giving rise to a sale." Justice Reed also expressed
doubt about the transaction's economic reality when he described
the taxpayer as making an irrevocable "election" to do business as a
corporation,8 6 comparable to choosing an accounting method 7 or
filing a joint return.88 Because a binding election can be made only
when each alternative receives legal sanction, 9 this analogy sug-
gested that both recognition and nonrecognition were somehow
"correct."
Justice Reed's views regarding economic reality were undoubt-
edly influenced by legislation enacted after the sale at issue in Hig-
gins. By the time of the Court's decision, Congress had already
acted prospectively to disallow losses on sales between wholly
owned corporations and their shareholders.9 This legislative deter-
84 1d. at 475.
85 Id. at 476.
86 d. at 477.
87 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 446 (1991).
8 8 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6013 (1991).
89 For example, in Thompson-King-Tate, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.2d 290, 294
(6th Cir. 1961), the court stated:
We recognize that where a taxpayer is authorized under the income tax stat-
utes to treat income from a transaction in either of two ways, his election to
treat it in one of those ways is binding upon him. But the principle of election
does not apply where the taxpayer has no legal opportunity to choose. If,
under the statutes, income must be reported in a certain way and the taxpayer
erroneously reports it in a different way, such treatment is not binding upon
either the taxpayer or the Commissioner.
In Le Bolt & Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 422, 426 (1929), the court held:
The weight of authority is to the effect that where there are two methods of
making an income tax return, either one of which is legal and proper, and the
taxpayer has made his return in accordance with one of these methods, then, if
the return is accepted and taxes paid accordingly, the taxpayer can not subse-
quently change to the other method of making a return and thereby become
entitled to a refund. But if there is only one legal and proper method of mak-
ing a return and the taxpayer erroneously makes his return by some other
method, then, even though the return has been accepted and the taxes paid, he
may file an amended return correcting the error, and if this return shows an
overpayment, he becomes entitled to a refund.
90 48 Stat. 691 (1934) (current version at I.R.C. § 267 (1991)).
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mination made it easy for Justice Reed to dismiss the sale as lacking
in reality.
A second important source of the one-way rule during phase one
was section 45 (now section 482) of the Code, which allowed the
Commissioner, but not the taxpayer, to allocate income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between related corporations. 9 Like Hig-
gins, section 45 dealt with the tax consequences of sales among re-
lated corporations. Furthermore, like the rule adopted in Higgins,
section 45 precluded the taxpayer from arguing against the form of
the transaction, on the congressionally sanctioned assumption that
such transactions lack economic reality.92 The close kinship of Hig-
gins and section 45 is evident in case law relying upon Higgins to
interpret that section. 93
91 In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses... owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may dis-
tribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances
between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines
that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482 (1991).
92 Despite some room for argument, it has always been clear that section 45 is a one-
way rule. See Cooper, Section 45, 4 TAX L. REV. 131, 162-66 (1949). For a more
recent statement of this position, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(3) (1990) ("Section 482
grants no right to a controlled taxpayer to apply its provisions at will, nor does it grant
any right to compel the district director to apply such provisions.").
93 See Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006, 1008 (2d Cir.)
(refusing to allow taxpayer to disregard controlled corporations), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
835 (1952). For later application of Higgins to sales between related corporations, see
Sterno Sales Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (applying one-
way rule to characterization of payment between brother-sister corporations).
This explanation of the rule may also shed light on the limitation on capital losses,
I.R.C. § 1211 (1991) (limiting deduction of capital losses by corporations and individu-
als), and the "wash" sale rule, I.R.C. § 1091 (1991) (deferring loss from sale of securi-
ties if taxpayer acquires substantially similar securities within thirty days). If economic
reality is equated with the Haig-Simons definition of income, see supra note 34 and
accompanying text, and the realization requirement with a formality that deviates from
this norm, these rules serve as one-way rules. In gain transactions, the taxpayer is
bound to his form and pays tax on the full amount of his realized gains; in loss transac-
tions, however, the taxpayer is denied full deduction despite realization. Otherwise, the
taxpayer could manipulate his realizations by selectively selling assets that give rise to a
loss. Interestingly, in enacting those rules, Congress expressed its concern for the un-
derlying economic reality. See H.R. REP. No. 1388, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 2-3 (1923)
(describing capital losses as frequently nothing more than paper losses) H.R. REP. No.
350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921) (describing wash sales as fictitious exchanges).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
C. Refusal to Extend the One-Way Rule Beyond
Related-Party Sales
In Higgins, the one-way rule lacked limitation. In succeeding
years, however, the Court confined the Higgins rule to a narrow
fact pattern: related-party sales. The Supreme Court refused to ap-
ply the rule to situations in which the Code or other bodies of law
defined economic reality. Thus, the Court refused to apply the one-
way rule in three situations: recognition of an entity as a separate
taxpayer, tax treatment of corporate distributions and adjustments,
and characterization of transactions among unrelated parties.
1. Recognition of Corporation as a Separate Taxpayer
On its face, Higgins seemingly estopped the taxpayer from ever
asserting that the reality of an entity differed from its form. None-
theless, applying Higgins was difficult when the issue was whether a
corporation would be recognized as a separate taxpayer subject to
corporate income tax. After all, the corporate tax is premised on
the assumption that corporations have economic reality. Congress
assumed that a corporation had independent reality and enacted a
tax on its income.94
Thus, when the issue of corporate existence was raised in Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,95 Justice Reed stated that a corpo-
ration would be recognized so long as its "purpose is the equivalent
of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business."9 6
This test allowed the taxpayer as well as the Commissioner to raise
the issue of corporate existence. Justice Reed distinguished Higgins
as involving "a sham or unreal" corporation and asserted that "[i]n
such situations the form is a bald and mischievous fiction."97 The
Court also adopted this distinction in National Carbide Corp. v.
Commissioner,98 in which the taxpayer was allowed to argue that
the corporation acted simply as an agent and was not taxable on
income it received.
Justice Reed's purported distinction of Higgins was disingenuous;
9 4 Congress' decision may have been necessitated by court decisions striking down
income taxes that ignored corporate existence; see Mundstock, Taxation of Intercorpo-
rate Dividends Under an Unintegrated Regime, 44 TAX L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1988).
95 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
9 6 1d. at 439.
9 7 Id. For a similar reading of Higgins, see Commissioner v. Laughton, 113 F.2d
103, 104 (9th Cir. 1940) (Higgins limited to sham transactions).
98 336 U.S. 422, 437 n.20 (1949) ("[E]ven a corporation which satisfies the usual tests
of agency may be disregarded by the Commissioner if it is a sham or unreal.").
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Higgins conceded that a corporation existed.99 In fact, Moline
Properties and National Carbide significantly curtailed Higgins."°
This curtailment of Higgins is evident in three opinions authored
by Judge Learned Hand in the 1940s. In United States v. Morris &
Essex Railroad,10 ' Judge Hand held that a corporation that leased
all its property to outsiders was taxable on the payments made di-
rectly by the outsiders to the shareholders, relying on Higgins to
dismiss the taxpayer's argument that the corporation did not consti-
tute a separate taxpayer. 0 2  After the Supreme Court's decision in
Moline Properties, however, Judge Hand acknowledged error in Na-
tional Investors Corp. v. Hoey 103 and permitted a taxpayer to chal-
lenge an assessment of corporate income tax on the ground that no
corporation existed. °4 Finally, in Commissioner v. National Car-
bide Corp. , 10 he recognized the weakness of Justice Reed's distinc-
tion by venturing that Higgins might "make it possible for the
Treasury at times to disregard transactions between... sharehold-
ers and [a] corporation even though it be a 'corporation' [because it
conducts business] although it must be confessed that the differentia
is left open."' 6
2. Corporate Distributions and Adjustments
The "election" underlying Higgins did not exist for issues involv-
ing the taxation of corporate distributions and adjustments, now
found in Subchapter C of the Code. 107 Those rules do not yield
99 It is clear an actual corporation existed. Numerous transactions were car-
ried on by it over a period of years. It paid taxes, state and national, franchise
and income. But the existence of an actual corporation is only one incident
necessary to complete an actual sale to it under the revenue act.
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1940).
10 '0 Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 438-41; National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 437.
101 135 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 320 U.S. 754 (1943).
10 2 Id. at 713 ("[T]he Treasury may take a taxpayer at his word, so to say; when that
serves its purpose, it may treat his corporation as a different person from himself; but
that is a rule which works only in the Treasury's own favor; it cannot be used to deplete
the revenue.").
103 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
104 Id. at 467 ("Wle were wrong [in Morris & Essex]; we neglected to observe that
the corporate 'form' must be 'unreal or a sham,' before the Treasury may disregard it;
we had taken too literally the concluding language that it was the 'command of income
and its benefits which marks the real owner of property.' ").
105 167 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
10 6 Id. at 307. For further discussion of Judge Hand's views of Higgins, see Chirel-
stein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440,
447-52 (1968).
107 I.R.C. §§ 301-86 (1991).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
different results depending upon whether a corporation exists. They
presume that a corporation exists and prescribe the means for mak-
ing various characterizations as, for example, whether a distribution
is a redemption or not. 1o The legislative attention given such char-
acterizations made it difficult for courts to assume blithely that they
lacked economic reality. Accordingly, these determinations were
less fertile ground for the one-way rule.
Both before and after Higgins, the Court allowed taxpayers to
challenge the form of a transaction when arguing for special treat-
ment under Subchapter C. Three years prior to Higgins, the Court
permitted a taxpayer to prove that, contrary to its form, a transac-
tion in substance constituted a tax-free reorganization. "° The
Court characterized the transaction "by what in fact was done
rather than by the mere form of words used in the writings em-
ployed," ' ° and determined whether a cash payment was in fact
made by the acquiring corporation or its shareholders.
After Higgins, the Court continued to allow taxpayers to argue
that a particular transaction in fact qualified as a reorganization. In
Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co. ,.. the Court held
that a transaction qualified as a reorganization even though the
transferred properties were owned by the creditors' committee
(rather than by the merged corporation). The Court dismissed such
ownership as adding "nothing of substance to the completed affair"
and as constituting a mere intermediate device.' 1 2
3. Unrelated-Party Transactions
The Higgins one-way rule was not applied to transactions among
unrelated parties. The lack of relationship among the parties made
it likely that economic reality coincided with the form of the agree-
ment. Moreover, when they did not coincide, economic reality
could be determined by reference to other, well-established bodies
of law. Thus, the Court allowed the taxpayer and Commissioner
alike to appeal to economic reality.
One month before deciding Higgins, the Court in Helvering v.
F & R. Lazarus & Co. 113 held that a nominal lessee could depreciate
property leased in a sale-leaseback transaction because the transac-
10 8 See I.R.C. § 302 (1991).
109 See Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937).
'10 Id. at 493 (citations omitted).
III 315 U.S. 179 (1942).
112 Id. at 185.
113 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
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tion was in reality a mere security device.' 14 In so holding, the
Court relied on a long line of authority treating a deed executed as
security for a loan as an equitable mortgage." 5
The Court squarely addressed Higgins' application to unrelated-
party transactions in Bartels v. Birmingham,"6 which considered
whether band leaders engaged to play in dance halls were responsi-
ble for paying employment taxes. This depended upon whether the
band leaders were employees or independent contractors. Conced-
ing that general principles made the band leaders independent con-
tractors, the IRS nonetheless ruled that the standard industry
contract rendered them employees."' The Court rejected the
ruling:
The argument of respondents to support the administrative inter-
pretation of the regulations is that the Government may accept
the voluntary contractual arrangements of the amusement opera-
tors and entertainers to shift the tax burden from the band lead-
ers to the operators. Cases [including Higgins] are cited to
support this position. All of these cases, however, involve the
problem of corporate or association entity. They are not perti-
nent upon the question of contracts to shift tax liability from one
taxpayer to another wholly distinct and disconnected corpora-
tion or individual. We do not think that such a contractual shift
authorizes the Commissioner to collect taxes from one not cov-
ered by the taxing statute.1 8
In determining economic reality, the Court drew upon precedent
interpreting "employee" in the National Labor Relations Act.' 9
114 Id. at 255. ("In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts,
are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not rig-
idly binding.")
115 Id. at 255 & n.8; see also 1 B. BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 3, 4.4.6
(noting long common law tradition, rooted in prohibitions on usury, permitting taxpay-
ers to establish that a sale-leaseback was a mortgage); 2 B. BrrKER, FEDERAL TAXA-
TION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 40.6.2 (1981); Cunningham & Tischler,
Disguised Real Estate Security Transactions as Mortgages in Substance, 26 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1 (1972).
116 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
117 Id. at 131.
118 Id. at 131-32 (footnotes omitted). For a similar, more recent reading of Higgins,
see Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503, 1512 (1991) (distinguish-
ing Higgins as involving sales that were not at arm's length and in which the seller
retained ownership of the sold property through a wholly owned corporation).
119 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1991). The Court relied on United States v. Silk, 331 U.S.
704 (1947), which, in interpreting the Social Security Act, had looked to the National
Labor Relations Act to differentiate an "employee" from an "independent contractor."
Id. at 713-14.
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D. Rationales for the One-Way Rule: Election
and Tax Avoidance
The rationales used to justify the one-way rule during phase one
reflected its narrow range. These rationales are implicit in Justice
Reed's discussion of Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co. 120
in Higgins:
In the Commonwealth Improvement Company case, the taxpayer,
for reasons satisfactory to itself voluntarily had chosen to employ
the corporation in its operations. A taxpayer is free to adopt
such organization for his affairs as he may choose and having
elected to do some business as a corporation, he must accept the
tax disadvantages.
On the other hand, the Government may not be required to
acquiesce in the taxpayer's election of that form for doing busi-
ness which is most advantageous to him. The Government may
look at actualities and upon determination that the form em-
ployed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax
event is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of
the fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax statute. To hold
otherwise would permit the schemes of taxpayers to supersede
legislation in the determination of the time and manner of taxa-
tion. It is command of income and its benefits which marks the
real owner of property.' 2'
Subsumed in this discussion are two rationales for the one-way
rule. One is the taxpayer's volition, his election. This rationale al-
ludes to the doctrine of election, which prevents taxpayers from re-
voking elections. 22 The second rationale is the systemic function of
the rule: its elimination of taxpayer "schemes." This rationale was
supported by citing cases in which the Court struck down tax
avoidance schemes,' 23 a line in which commentators placed
Higgins. 1
24
Both rationales suggest a narrow scope for the rule. The doctrine
120 287 U.S. 415 (1932).
121 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1940) (footnotes omitted).
122 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
123 Higgins, 308 U.S. at 478 n.l1. These cases were Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111
(1930) (wage earner taxed on salary despite anticipatory assignment of wages); Corliss
v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) (income of revocable trust taxed to the grantor); Grif-
fiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939) (seller cannot avoid tax consequences of sale
by interposing intermediary corporation).
124 Contemporary commentators believed that tax avoidance concerns motivated the
result in Higgins. See Rudick, The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance, 7 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 257-58 (1940); Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal
Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 U. ILL. L. REV. 779, 803
(1941).
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of election implies a narrow scope because it applies only in limited,
usually legislatively sanctioned, situations. For an election to oc-
cur, the chosen characterization and alternative characterizations
both must be permissible,' 25 and an unequivocal representation
must be made to the IRS, generally on a tax return. 2 ' Thus, an
election rarely occurs. To call a choice of business entity an "elec-
tion" is to stretch considerably the doctrine of election.
Likewise, tax avoidance suggests narrow application for the one-
way rule. The notion that the intent to avoid taxes can, standing
alone, justify imposing a tax is highly controversial. 127 Professors
Bittker and Lokken, for example, argue that, at most, such intent
influences a court in a borderline situation.' 28 The shakiness of this
foundation reflected the narrow role accorded the one-way rule.
III
PHASE Two: UNCERTAIN APPLICATION OF THE ONE-
WAY RULE BASED ON THE THEORIES OF
CHOICE AND CERTAINTY
A. The Collapse of Sharply Demarcated Spheres
From 1950 to 1970, courts extended the one-way rule outside its
previous narrow confines. In part, this extension may have resulted
from the severance of tax from administrative law.' 29 After the
1940s, courts seldom overtly equated the one-way rule with defer-
ence to agencies.
Moreover, even in administrative law, the notion of powers abso-
lute in their spheres diminished in importance. As the delegation
doctrine lost vitality, agency authority became less of an on/off is-
sue. 130 Viewing statutes less often as sources of positive law, courts
125 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
126 See J. E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55, 59 (1940); Pacific Nat'l Co.
v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191, 194 (1938). See generally, Maguire & Zimet, Hobson's Choice
and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281-93 (1935)
(discussing election in federal tax law).
127 See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930) ("The fact
that [the taxpayer] desired to evade the law ... is immaterial, because the very meaning
of a line in the law is that you may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it.");
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) ("Any one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern
which will best pay the Treasury .... "), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); see also I B.
BITTKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 3, at 4-29 to 4-30.
128 See 1 B. BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 3, at 4-31.
129 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
130 After Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), the delegation doctrine lost
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were more accepting of agencies' authority to interpret law. 3 1 As
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has observed, there was a movement
away from sharp distinctions in the allocation of authority between
court and agency that began in the 1950s, 132 and continued into the
1980s,' 33 culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 134 As a re-
sult, the relationship between agency and judicial determinations
became less certain in two respects.
First, deference to agency determinations was less rigorously con-
fined to determinations within the scope of the statute. Courts in-
creasingly described agency and judicial interpretations of statutes
as occupying a common domain in which agency interpretations
were accorded weight, rather than a presumption of correctness if
force. See Aranson, Gellhorn, & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Con-
NELL L. REV. 1, 12 (1982) (delegation doctrine called "nondoctrine"); Schwartz, Of
Administrators and Philosopher-King&" The Republic, the Laws, and Delegations of
Power, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 443, 446 (1977) (describing delegation doctrine as "virtually
shorn of practical meaning").
131 See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 24 (describing the consistent narrowing of
judicial review of agency decisions over the course of the twentieth century); Diver,
supra note 19, at 569; Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline
ofthe Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 286 (1988) ("If expansive delegations
of legislative authority are permissible, interpretations made in pursuit of that authority
merit judicial deference.").
132 [T]he movement clearly has been away from sharp distinctions between what
is reasonable and what is correct, between the rational and the right, between
what is within the area for administrative discretion and what is the proper
interpretation of the statute or other law. Whereas in the 1950s those distinc-
tions often seemed to be the basis for judicial reasoning as to the proper scope
of review, in the 1970s those distinctions still enter into judicial rhetoric and
occasionally seem to affect the reasoning but no longer are generally the cen-
tral factor around which all other factors concerning the scope of review
revolve.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 688-89 (1976).
133 See 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:11, at 375-76 (2d ed.
1984) ("During the past few years, the Court has started to use the language of 'defer-
ence' for an agency's view, but the slight change in verbiage does not affect what the
Court does, except that the idea of deference permits a straddle between the rightness
test and the reasonableness test.").
134 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) ("We have long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer .... "). See also Saunders, Agency Interpretations and Judicial
Review: A Search for Limitations on the Controlling Effect Given Agency Statutory Con-
structions, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 769, 770 (1988) ("Developments in recent years have
blurred the distinction between legislative and interpretative rules to the point where at
least some, and perhaps all, interpretative rules are now accorded legislative effect
.... "); Kmiec, supra note 131, at 271-80 (arguing that Chevron was a natural out-
growth of the decline of the nondelegation doctrine); id. at 281, 286 (noting the link
between Chevron and the decline of Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)).
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reasonable. For example, in interpreting the term "deceptive prac-
tices" in the Federal Trade Act, the Supreme Court described its
relationship to the Federal Trade Commission as follows:
This Court has frequently stated that the Commission's judg-
ment is to be given great weight by reviewing courts.... Never-
theless, while informed judicial determination is dependent upon
enlightenment gained from administrative experience, in the last
analysis the words 'deceptive practices' set forth a legal standard
and they must get their final meaning from judicial
construction. 1 35
The second consequence of the breakdown of a clear distinction
between the spheres of agency and judicial power was inconsis-
tency. Without recourse to spheres, courts vacillated unpredictably
between deference and independent judgment.136 In one case, the
Supreme Court described the "great deference to the interpretation
given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its adminis-
tration,"'137 while in another case, it observed that the meaning of
statutory terms "must ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of
matters within the special competence of the [agency], but by judi-
cial application of canons of statutory construction."' a
B. Erratic Extension of the One- Way Rule
The two consequences associated with the collapse of the sharply
delineated agency and judicial realms of competence were reflected
in the use of the one-way rule. Just as deference to agencies was
extended to determinations outside the scope of the statute, so also
135 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (footnotes omitted). See
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745- 46 (1973); Volks-
wagenwerk v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272, amended, 392 U.S. 901
(1968); see also Labor Bd. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965) ("Courts should be 'slow
to overturn an administrative decision,' but they are not left 'to sheer acceptance' of the
Board's conclusions.") (citations omitted); Diver, supra note 19, at 562-63.
136 Diver, supra note 19, at 563-64. See 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 132, at 375 ("[T]he
Supreme Court has long maintained two lines of cases on the scope of review of apply-
ing law to undisputed or established facts. In one line, the Court substitutes judgment,
and in the other line it uses a reasonableness or rational basis test."); B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 55, at 659 (noting inconsistent application of doctrine of Gray v. Powell);
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 292-94 (1986)
(describing two lines of cases); see also Judge Friendly's discussion in Pittston Stevedor-
ing Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (With respect to deference to
agency interpretations of statutes, "there are two lines of Supreme Court decisions on
this subject which are analytically in conflict."), aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Ter-
minal Operating Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
137 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
138 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
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was the one-way rule extended to a wide variety of issues beyond
related-party sales. Just as courts erratically alternated between
deference and independent judgment, so also did they equivocate
between adoption and rejection of the one-way rule.
This erratic extension surfaced in a variety of settings: recogni-
tion of choice of entity, corporate distributions and adjustments,
other related-party transactions, and unrelated-party transactions.
Courts expanded the one-way rule to situations in which economic
reality was obscure, albeit not as obscure as related-party sales.
Thus, courts were most drawn to the rule in interpreting statutory
terms of art lacking real life analogues,13 9 and in analyzing related-
party transactions.
1. Recognition of Choice of Entity
Choice of business entity is inherently a formal inquiry. Corpora-
tions are by definition legal fictions. Thus, although several courts
followed Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner " and National
Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 ' and rejected the one-way rule on
issues of corporate existence and agency,"" others relied upon the
rule to decide whether a corporation existed for tax purposes. 143
Two Tax Court decisions from the same term illustrate this
equivocation. In deciding whether certain insurance income was
earned by a corporation or its sole shareholder, the Tax Court in
139 See Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation (book review), 49 U.
CHi. L. REV. 859, 879 (1982) ("When we are dealing with statutory terms of art, the
form-substance dichotomy is a false one. 'Substance' can only be derived from forms
created by the statute itself. Here substance is form and little else; there is no natural
law of reverse triangular mergers.") (emphasis in original).
140 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
141 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
142 See United States v. Brager Bldg. & Land Corp., 124 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir.
1941) ("[lIt is going too far to say that if a taxpayer forms a corporation for his conven-
ience, he is thereafter estopped from disclosing the true nature of the arrangement,
whenever it is of advantage to the government to recognize only the corporate form.").
For a recent case in which the taxpayer successfully asserted the agency theory, see
Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988).
143 See, e.g., Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395, 398-99 (2d Cir.
1960) ("[T]he Commissioner, [in order] to prevent unfair tax avoidance, has greater
freedom and responsibility to disregard the corporate entity than a taxpayer, who nor-
mally cannot be heard to complain that a corporation which he has created, and which
has served his purpose well, is a sham."), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961); Love v.
United States, 96 F. Supp. 919, 921 (Ct. Cl. 1951) ("[T]he taxpayer may not escape the
tax consequences of a business arrangement which he [has] made upon the asserted
ground that the arrangement was fictional.").
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Shaw v. Commissioner " stated that the "preference for substance
over form in tax matters extends to claims of petitioner and respon-
dent alike."' 45  Within four months, however, in determining
whether corporations organized to hold title in order to avoid state
law usury restrictions constituted agents of the shareholder, the
same court in Bolger v. Commissioner '" acknowledged that "the
taxpayer may have less freedom than the Commissioner to ignore
the transactional form that he has adopted."' 47
Partnership formation entails different formalities than incorpo-
ration. Nonetheless, it is also difficult to attribute independent sig-
nificance to the mutual agency created by a partnership agreement
among related persons. Thus, courts also applied the one-way rule
when a taxpayer, who had ostensibly formed a family partnership,
later challenged its existence in order to claim its losses on his indi-
vidual return.148
2. Corporate Distributions and Adjustments
Despite the detailed statutory rules contained in Subchapter C,
corporate distributions lack an easily ascertained economic reality.
Such distributions generally have no significance apart from their
tax consequences. As one authority put it, "[T]here is no independ-
ent economic substance to a distribution. Its economic effect is the
tax result . .. .",'
Thus, cases interpreting Subchapter C were divided. Some
courts, following Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co. ,'
rejected the one-way rule. For instance, in Ciaio v. Commis-
sioner,'5' the Tax Court considered whether a corporation made a
"distribution" when it purchased the stock on behalf of a continu-
ing shareholder who formally had that obligation. The corporation
144 59 T.C. 375 (1972).
14 5 Id. at 383-84.
146 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
14 7 Id. at 767 n.4.
148 See Demirjian v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1, 5 (3d Cir. 1972) (describing cases
holding that persons who represent to the IRS that property is owned by a partnership
are bound by such representations); Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir.
1952); Sherman v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 369, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d
600 (3d Cir. 1957); see also Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 753 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suggesting that government might hold a taxpayer to his
decision to enter into a partnership agreement).
149 Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J.
861, 873 (1976) (emphasis in original).
150 315 U.S. 179 (1942).
151 47 T.C. 447 (1967).
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had originally been the buyer in the agreement, but in order to ob-
tain financing, had substituted the shareholder's name. Finding no
"distribution" occurred, the court noted that, despite the formal
substitution, the obligation to purchase the stock belonged to the
corporation and not the continuing shareholder."5 2 In reaching its
conclusion, the court observed that "[t]he taxpayer as well as the
Government is entitled to the benefit of the rule that the substance
rather than the form of the transaction controls."1 3
Other courts, unable to see the economic reality underlying a re-
demption,154 adopted the one-way rule. For example, in Television
Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,' Judge Friendly held for the Sec-
ond Circuit that a dividend arose when a person purchased stock
from a third party and immediately sold part of it back to the cor-
poration. In dismissing the argument that the substance of the
transaction was identical to a joint purchase by the purchaser and
the corporation, Judge Friendly relied upon Higgins56 Similarly,
in Woodworth v. Commissioner,"5 7 the Sixth Circuit found a divi-
dend occurred when several shareholders borrowed from a corpora-
tion, bought out another shareholder, and surrendered part of their
stock to the corporation in exchange for release of their debt. The
court reached this result notwithstanding that no dividend would
have occurred had the selling shareholder merely redeemed his
stock.' 58
3. Related-Party Transactions Generally
Many tax issues do not turn on formal inquiries such as whether
a corporation exists or whether a transaction falls within a term of
art contained in the Code. Some Code concepts mimic business
practice. 5 9 In such situations, there is more likely to be an ascer-
152Id. at 461-62.
153 Id. at 457; see also J. M. Turner & Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 370, 377 (4th
Cir. 1957) (allowing taxpayer to argue that the substance of a transaction was a tax-free
exchange).
154 See I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) (1991).
155 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960).
156 1d. at 325.
157 218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1955).
158 Id. at 724. For other cases foreclosing shareholders from arguing that a distribu-
tion is not essentially equivalent to a dividend, see Edmister v. Commissioner, 391 F.2d
584, 586 (6th Cir. 1968); Wiseman v. United States, 371 F.2d 816, 818 (1st Cir. 1967);
United States v. Collins, 300 F.2d 821, 825, modified, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962).
159 [T]he Code taxes a 'sale' without defining what a sale is; business and com-
mercial experience supply that knowledge .... It follows that someone who
has engaged in a transaction cannot.. . make it a 'sale' simply by writing that
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tainable economic reality. Nonetheless, the possibility that related
parties will manipulate forms generally used in commercial transac-
tions still gives cause for concern.
Thus, the same divided attitude seen in Subchapter C cases ex-
tended more generally to transactions among related parties. Some
courts continued to search for economic reality in these transac-
tions. In Peerless Steel Equipment Co. v. Commissioner,"6 for ex-
ample, the Tax Court considered whether payments from a pension
trust to a related corporation 161 were made to cancel a lease. In
refusing to bind the corporation to the form of its agreement with
the pension plan, the court observed:
Though there may be some attractive reasons for requiring a
taxpayer to adhere to the form that he has created, the even-
handed application of the law requires us to allow taxpayers the
opportunity to show that their true intent was different from
what was said ....
Other courts, doubtful of underlying economic reality, applied
the one-way rule to related-party transactions. For example, in
Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co. ,163 the
Supreme Court considered whether an amortizable bond discount
arose from exchanging stock for debt. Finding that such discount
required speculation as to market behavior, 16' the Court relied on
Higgins to dismiss the taxpayer's argument that the transaction was
equivalent to the sale of debt for cash followed by the redemption of
the preferred stock.'65 Likewise, in Freeman v. Commissioner,66
the Eighth Circuit denied shareholders the use of the installment
method 167 in reporting income from a third-party note distributed
in complete liquidation, but conceded that a note issued directly by
word at the top of the agreement .... [W]here the Code follows life, life is
determinative.
Isenbergh, supra note 139, at 864-65 (footnotes omitted) (distinguishing statutes that
refer to the world from statutes that create relationships themselves).
160 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 880 (1967).
161 The principal executive officers of the corporation were also trustees of the trust.
Id. at 880.
162 Id. at 883, see also J. M. Turner & Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 370, 377 (4th
Cir. 1957) (taxpayer not bound to the "bare form" of a transfer as a sale, and instead
may characterize the transfer as a contribution to capital pursuant to an incorporation).
163 417 U.S. 134 (1974).
164Id. at 149-55.
165 d. at 149.
166 303 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1962).
167 See I.R.C. § 453 (1991).
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the liquidating corporation would have qualified for that method. 68
4. Unrelated-Party Transactions
As stated above, courts feel most secure in determining the eco-
nomic reality for transactions among unrelated parties. For twenty
years after Bartels v. Birmingham,169 courts refused to apply the
one-way rule to unrelated-party transactions. 170 One common issue
on which a taxpayer was permitted to disregard a chosen form was
whether a transaction constituted a sale or a loan. For example, in
Estate of Wienert v. Commissioner, 7' Judge Wisdom held that de-
spite casting a transaction as a loan, the holder of a production right
in a mineral interest was nonetheless treated as owner and taxable
thereon. In so holding, Judge Wisdom emphasized that "[riesort to
substance is not a right reserved for the Commissioner's exclusive
benefit .... The taxpayer too has a right to assert the priority of
substance .... 172
Another noteworthy situation involved characterizing payments
made pursuant to a divorce settlement. In Landa v. Commis-
sioner,'7 3 Judge Bazelon, relying on Helvering v. F & R. Lazarus &
Co. ,174 held that the characterization of payments contained in a
written divorce settlement did not bind the taxpayer. 75 The result
in Landa was widely followed. 176
Nonetheless, even in unrelated-party transactions, courts occa-
sionally cited the one-way rule. In Victorson v. Commissioner, 77
the Second Circuit relied on Television Industries to reject the tax-
payer's argument that an agreement styled as an option should be
168 Freeman, 303 F.2d at 584-85; see also Matthews v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 5-5974 (D.S.C. 1975) (capital gains treatment under corporate liquidation provi-
sion (section 331) denied when distributions were made to the taxpayer rather than to
his wholly owned corporation).
169 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
170 See, e-g., Read v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 123, 128 (1954) (payments
treated as received from the sale of a capital asset, notwithstanding representations in
the contract that amounts were received in exchange for services rendered).
171 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961).
172 Id. at 755.
173 206 F.2d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
174 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
175 Landa, 206 F.2d at 432.
176 See, e.g., Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786, 789 (10th Cir. 1963); Riddell
v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1960); Thorsness v. United States, 260 F.2d
341, 345 (7th Cir. 1958).
177 326 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1964).
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treated as an immediate sale.' 78 Likewise, in determining the char-
acter of gain from selling a contract, that same court later used Tel-
evision Industries to bind a taxpayer to his decision to enter into a
new contract rather than renegotiate a prior one.' 79
C. Variable Weight Accorded the One- Way Rule
The collapse of sharply demarcated spheres also affected the
weight given the one-way rule. Just as courts regarded administra-
tive determinations as "factors" in determining statutory meaning,
they also viewed an argument's pedigree as a mere "factor" in
resolving a tax case. The phase two cases invariably bolstered their
recitation of the one-way rule with arguments that the result com-
ported with the substance of the transaction,' 80 or that the form of
the transaction controlled for tax purposes.' For example, Judge
Friendly did not conclude his analysis in Television Industries with
a recitation of the one-way rule but instead went on to find the
transaction essentially equivalent to a dividend within the statutory
language. 1812
Warsaw Photographic Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner 183 further
illustrates this equivocation. In Warsaw Photographic, the Tax
Court apparently held the taxpayer, but not the Commissioner, to
the requirement that the transferee corporation actually transfer
and distribute its stock in order to qualify as a "D" reorganiza-
tion.'84 Close reading of the decision reveals, however, that the
178 Id. at 266.
179 Brook v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 1011, 1014 (2d Cir. 1966).
18 0 See Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 533, 541-42 (1986) (applying the one-
way rule but also finding that form coincided with substance).
I8 See Woodworth v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719, 724 (6th Cir. 1955) ("Indeed the
statute directs that the 'manner' of the transaction be a controlling factor.").
182 Television Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1960).
183 84 T.C. 21 (1985).
184 Id. at 43.
[I]n each of these cases in which a court has held that the requirement of an
actual stock transfer and distribution may be ignored, it was respondent who
urged on the court that the realities of the situation belied the form chosen by
the taxpayer. In those situations where the courts have departed from the
literal language of the statute, it was to counter a perceived abuse by the tax-
payer, these courts having concluded that the taxpayer should not be permit-
ted to shape the form of the transaction so as to secure an unwarranted
benefit.... We have not found, and petitioner has not cited us to, any case in
this area in which the court has acceded to a taxpayer's urging that the tax-
payer be permitted to obtain a D reorganization tax benefit even though the
form of the transaction which the taxpayer shaped did not meet the literal
requirements of the statute.
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court also distinguished the cases in which no actual transfer and
distribution occurred as involving identical ownership.8 5 The
court also rejected the argument that there were equivalent means
by which the taxpayer might have achieved the same tax result.' 86
The court did not, however, rest there, and went on to say that
"[w]hen we examine the substance of what was done, we conclude
that it points toward 'sale' at least as much as toward
'reorganization.' "187
The tendency to supplement the one-way rule is evident in virtu-
ally all phase two cases. The partnership cases, for example, also
equivocated between the one-way rule and other grounds.' 8 For
example, in Sherman v. United States,189 the court initially stated
that the taxpayer could not disavow the business form,"9° but ulti-
mately found that a partnership existed because of the intent of the
parties. '91
D. Choice and Certainty Replace Election and Tax Avoidance as
Rationales for the One- Way Rule
With the collapse of sharply demarcated spheres, the rationale
for the one-way rule became broader and more inclusive. At first
glance, the phase two cases appeared to adopt the phase one theory,
citing Higgins and alluding to the taxpayer's election. They contain
formulations such as "'once a taxpayer elects a particular mode of
business procedure, he cannot avoid the statutory ramifications of
his action by indicating results which might have obtained under
Id. at 39 (citation omitted); see I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(D) (1991).
185 "All of these authorities on which petitioner relies are distinguishable from the
instant case in that the transferors and transferees in those instances had identical own-
ership, while in the instant case, the ownership interests ... differed widely." Warsaw
Photographic, 84 T.C. at 39 (footnote omitted). Presumably, the presence of identical
ownership lessened the need to comply with statutory niceties because it indicated that
no substantive change in ownership had occurred.
186 Id. at 40 n.23 (" 'Petitioners are liable for the tax consequences of the transaction
that they actually executed; they may not reap the benefits of some other transaction
that they might have effected instead.' ") (quoting Brown v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d
755, 756 (6th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted)).
187 Id.
188 See Demirjian v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1, 4-5 (3d Cir. 1972) (finding of fact
that partnership existed); Phillips v. United States, 193 F.2d 132, 134 (5th Cir. 1951)
(finding sharing of profits and losses).
189 141 F. Supp. 369, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1957).
19OSherman, 141 F. Supp. at 370.
19 11d. at 371.
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alternate procedures,' "192 and the taxpayer "elected the form and
arrangement in which he would do business."1 93
Despite this reliance, the phase two cases in fact generalize the
phase one theory. They apply the one-way rule in a variety of situa-
tions in which it is difficult to find an "election" or "tax avoidance,"
as Higgins used those terms. As mentioned above, a binding elec-
tion can be made only if two permissible tax characterizations exist;
no binding election can be made if only one proper tax treatment
exists.'94 In Higgins, the alternative tax consequences flowed from
the choice of either respecting or disregarding the corporate en-
tity.' 9 In the phase two cases, the alternative tax consequences do
not flow from this choice. An election exists in the phase two cases
only if tax law, and corporate tax law in particular, is itself elective,
because its formality allows taxpayers to choose their tax
consequences.
Jurists occasionally articulate this broad view of election. Profes-
sor Chirelstein, for instance, credits Judge Learned Hand with
viewing the Code as "in part a clumsy system of implied elections,
of which some, such as the choice to do business in corporate form,
are freely exercisable by the taxpayer and binding on the Commis-
sioner, while others, notably those involving self-dealing transac-
tions, are within the Commissioner's discretion to approve or
reject."' 9 6 Under this view, ambiguous transactions are generally
characterized in the Commissioner's favor unless the taxpayer
shows that economic substance supports the form.' 97 This broad
view of election, however, is not generally accepted.' 98
Accordingly, the phase two cases slipped from the rhetoric of
election into the rhetoric of choice:
If a taxpayer having a choice of methods accomplishing an eco-
nomic or business result pursues a particular means to accom-
plish his ends, he must abide the tax consequences resulting from
his choice of methods, even though had he made another choice
192 Wiseman v. United States, 371 F.2d 816, 818 (1st Cir. 1967) (quoting United
States v. Collins, 300 F.2d 821, 825, modified, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962)).
193 Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1952); see also Sherman, 141 F.
Supp. at 370 ("[Pllaintiffs elected to begin and continue business as a partnership, and
they will not now be heard to disavow that partnership.").
194 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
195 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 475-76 (1940).
196 Chirelstein, supra note 106, at 471.
197 See Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 410-12 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dis-
senting); see also Chirelstein, supra note 106, at 464.
198 See 1 B. BIrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 3, 4.3.3.
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the tax consequences would have been less severe or even
nonexistent. 1 99
"Choice" does not imply a binding selection between equally ac-
ceptable alternatives. Rather, that term permits courts to give
weight to a characterization whenever doubt exists as to the proper
tax treatment.
It is also difficult to stretch the notion of tax avoidance to phase
two fact situations. In phase two cases, the taxpayer's scheme does
not threaten to supersede the taxing statute; indeed, the issue at
hand is often within congressional contemplation.2 "0 Thus, these
cases do not mention tax avoidance, but instead emphasize the more
general need for certainty. For example, in Television Industries,
Judge Friendly noted:
The Commissioner is justified in determining the tax effect of
transactions on the basis in which taxpayers have molded them,
although he may not always be required to do so. It would be
quite intolerable to pyramid the existing complexities of tax law
by a rule that the tax shall be that resulting from the form of
transaction taxpayers have chosen or from any other form they
might have chosen, whichever is less.
20 1
Likewise, in National Alfalfa, the Supreme Court observed:
[W]hile a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses,
nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax conse-
quences of his choice, whether contemplated or not, and may not
enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen to
follow but did not. 'To make the taxability of the transaction
depend upon the determination whether there existed an alterna-
tive form which the statute did not tax would create burden and
uncertainty.'
20 2
199 Freeman v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 580, 584-85 (8th Cir. 1962). For similar
formulations, see Edmister v. Commissioner, 391 F.2d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 1968) ("[T]he
Commissioner and the Courts are justified in treating transactions for tax purposes ac-
cording to the plan adopted by the taxpayer rather than on the basis of some other plan
that might have been adopted."); Woodworth v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719, 724 (6th
Cir. 1955) (quoting Woodruff v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 429, 430 (5th Cir. 1942)) (" 'If
a taxpayer has two legal methods by which he may attain a desired result, the method
pursued is determinative for tax purposes without regard to the fact that different tax
results would have attached if the alternative procedure had been followed.' ").
20 0 See, e.g., Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S.
134, 149 (1974); Television Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.
1960); see also supra notes 94 & 107 and accompanying text.
201 Television Indus, Inc., 284 F.2d at 325 (citations omitted).
202 National Alfalfa, 417 U.S. at 149 (citations omitted) (quoting Founders Gen.
Corp. v. Hoey, 300 U.S. 268, 275 (1937)); see also Victorson v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d
264, 266 (2d Cir. 1964) (acceding to taxpayer's arguments regarding form "would intro-
duce unnecessary uncertainty into future cases").
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To summarize, despite their reliance on Higgins, the phase two
cases used the one-way rule differently. Seldom decisive, sometimes
ignored, the rule generally served to conserve the judicial resources
that a lengthy inquiry into economic reality would expend. Unwill-
ing to abandon wholly the inquiry into economic reality in the ab-
sence of statutory authorization, courts hedged their holdings by
leaving open the door to an IRS challenge on similar facts.
IV
PHASE THREE: HEIGHTENED WEIGHT ACCORDED
THE ONE-WAY RULE BASED ON THEORIES
OF BARGAIN AND WHIPSAW
A. From Economic Reality to Transactional Consistency
During phase three, the one-way rule was chiefly influenced by
two intellectual movements outside administrative law. Together,
these movements made courts more willing to substitute transac-
tional consistency for economic reality.
1. Growing Doubt About Economic Reality
The first movement making courts more willing to appeal to
transactional consistency was an increasing doubt in the existence
of an objective economic reality. This movement paralleled devel-
opments in statutory interpretation generally. As mentioned above,
courts ameliorated the tension between formal and substantive in-
terpretation during the 1940s and 1950s by searching for "statutory
purpose," a term that avoided rigidity while curbing judicial discre-
tion.2"3 After 1960, however, jurists increasingly viewed the legisla-
tive process as reaching compromises among competing interest
groups. In this context, the courts found it difficult to believe that a
statute embodied a transcendent purpose. 2°4 Without statutory
purpose, jurists resorted to other means of resolving the tension be-
tween formal and substantive decisionmaking.
In tax law, "economic reality" plays much the same role that
"statutory purpose" does in statutory law generally. It is therefore
not surprising that from 1960 to 1990 jurists grew increasingly
skeptical about the existence of an independent economic reality
apart from tax consequences. Viewing tax law as the product of a
203 See Blatt, supra note 29, at 828-34.
204See id. at 837-43.
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compromise among competing interest groups,2 °5 they found it
harder to believe in an underlying economic reality. One symptom
of this shift was the growing realization that many tax rules are
better understood as implementing expenditure programs 2° than as
measuring income.
20 7
Another symptom was the growing recognition that tax consider-
ations often shape commercial practice. As a practical matter, the
most important consequence of a state law characterization may be
its federal income tax effect. For example, the whole purpose of a
sale-leaseback transaction may be to allocate the benefit of the de-
preciation deduction. In such situations, commercial practice
ceases to provide an objective reference point for economic reality.
2. Rise of the Transactional Approach to Taxation
The second movement making courts more willing to look for
transactional consistency was a movement toward what might be
termed a "transactional" approach to taxation. This approach re-
placed taxation of individuals with taxation of transactions: the
touchstone for taxation shifted from each taxpayer's income to the
agreement among the taxpayers.
Focusing on the transaction, courts broadened their inquiry from
the bipolar dispute between the IRS and a single taxpayer over eco-
nomic reality to the relationship among several parties, of whom the
IRS was but one. The movement toward the transactional ap-
proach may have been attributable to growing doubt regarding eco-
nomic reality. Agnostic about the economic reality of each party's
income, courts substituted consistency as a minimum threshold.
Whatever the meaning of economic reality, it did not permit incon-
sistent treatment.
205 See, e.g., L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 3-4 (1961); see also id.
at 201 ("The public interest is not some manifest essence that transcends the realm of
private interests. It is a changing product that is periodically distilled from the pres-
sures of competing interests in response to the prevailing preferences of the moment.");
Douglas, Mr. Citizen vs. the Treasury (Book Review), 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 689, 689
(1961) ("Our tax system was not designed by noblemen only to be subverted by base
people. It represents a series of victories by special interest groups, each motivated by
selfish ends.").
206See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); Bittker, Accounting for
Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969). The
Treasury Department adopted a tax expenditure budget in 1976. See U.S. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1976, at 101-17 (1976).
207 See Coven, The Decline and Fall of Taxable Income, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1525
(1981).
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The transactional approach was variously manifested. One mani-
festation was the judicial understanding of Subchapter K of the
Code, which governs partnerships. Appealing to the "flexibility" 20
8
implicit in Subchapter K, courts abandoned the inquiry into eco-
nomic reality and deferred to the partnership agreement. Accord-
ing to the Tax Court:
Tax law in respect of partners may often involve a delicate mech-
anism, for a ruling in favor of one partner may automatically
produce adverse consequences to the others. Accordingly, one of
the underlying philosophic objectives of the 1954 Code was to
permit the partners themselves to determine their tax burdens
inter sese to a certain extent .... The theory was that the part-
ners would take their prospective tax liabilities into account in
bargaining with one another. 20 9
This reasoning extended beyond Subchapter K. For example, in
distinguishing debt from equity in Ragland Investment Co. v. Com-
missioner,2"' the Tax Court considered it relevant that "the parties
entered into protracted arm's-length bargaining concerning the
form the transaction should take with full awareness that a tax ad-
vantage to one would result in a concomitant tax disadvantage to
the other."' 21 ' The significance of this step is evident in the dissent-
ing opinion, which sharply criticized the theory that "the parties to
a business transaction can determine between themselves which
party the Government shall tax."21 2
Another manifestation of the transactional approach was the in-
creasing attention courts paid to the possibility that unrelated per-
sons might whipsaw the government. The very perception of a
whipsaw problem in unrelated-party transactions assumes that the
transaction, rather than the particular party before the court, is the
appropriate frame of reference. Before 1965, inconsistent positions
208 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1954) (describing principal
objectives as "simplicity, flexibility, and equity as between the partners"); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1954) (same).
209 Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535, 551 (1964) (footnote omitted), aff'd, 352
F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965). See also Smith v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1033, 1038 (describ-
ing flexibility as allowing the partners to "determine the tax consequences of a liquida-
tion payment by the choice of words in the partnership agreement") (footnote omitted),
aff'd, 313 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1962).
210 52 T.C. 867 (1969), aff'dper curiam, 435 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1970).
211 Ragland, 52 T.C. at 878.
212 Id. at 879 (Tietjens, J., dissenting) (noting that form opens questions under the
taxing statute rather than closes them); see also Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Signifi-
cance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 450-
57 (1971).
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were troubling only when held by related taxpayers. The leading
study of inconsistent reporting positions focused only on related
taxpayers,213 and the provisions of the 1954 Code, intended to miti-
gate the effect of such inconsistencies, addressed only inconsisten-
cies among related taxpayers.214 After 1965, however, whipsaw
resulting from transactions among unrelated taxpayers received
considerable attention. Courts grew increasingly concerned with
whipsaw,215 and several law review articles specifically defined
"whipsaw" to include transactions among unrelated persons.216
A suggestive analogue for the emergence of the transactional ap-
proach to taxation is the growing emphasis on the transaction in
civil procedure during the same period.21 In the 1940s, for plead-
ing purposes, a claim generally was confined to a narrowly defined
"cause of action," a particular legal theory applied to a set of facts.
By the 1980s, however, a claim had been expanded to include all
legal consequences arising from a given transaction or occur-
rence. 2 " As a consequence, the class of persons allowed to inter-
vene in litigation grew from those potentially bound by the
213 See Plumb, The Problem of Related Taxpayers: A Procedural Study, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 225 (1952). Although Plumb defined the term "related taxpayer" broadly to in-
clude any persons who may be taxable on the same income, the only apparent purpose
of this broad definition was to include ex-spouses, not persons wholly lacking in rela-
tionship. Id. at 226 nn.4-5.
2 14 See I.R.C. §§ 1312, 1313(c)(1) (1958).
215 A Lexis search performed July 8, 1991 revealed that the word "whipsaw" ap-
peared 63 times in federal tax cases, but only three times before 1970.216 See Lake, The Whipsaw Problem in Federal Tax Controversies, 34 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 867, 867 (1976) ("mhe whipsaw problem can be defined as the assertion of
inconsistent tax claims by or against two parties to the same transaction where only one
claim should logically succeed under the tax laws."); Miller, Remarks, 25 TAX LAw.
193, 193 (1972) ("A whipsaw situation occurs in the tax field when two different taxpay-
ers take positions with respect to a particular transaction which are so inconsistent with
each other that only one should logically succeed .... "); see also Special Committee on
Whipsaw, supra note 7.
2 17 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1282, 1290 (1976); see also Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (describing the emergence of the interest represen-
tation model of administrative law, under which litigation was no longer treated as
bipolar).
218 Compare RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 61 (1942) (cause of action test) with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) (transaction test); compare also
Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 343 (1948) (proposing cause of
action approach) with C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4407 (1981) (defending transactional approach). See id. §§ 4463-
64 (discussing traditional requirement of mutuality and its abandonment); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment a, h (1982) (describing shift from cause
of action to transactional approach).
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judgment to all interested in the transaction.219 Although no one
consciously linked developments in tax law with those in civil pro-
cedure, this simultaneous emphasis on transaction suggests a com-
mon mindset.
3. From Lazarus to Frank Lyon
The movement from economic reality to transactional consis-
tency is evident in two Supreme Court decisions involving sale-
leaseback transactions, decided nearly forty years apart. In 1939,
the Court in Helvering v. F & R. Lazarus & Co. 220 determined that
the conveyance of title to real property to a bank, coupled with a
ninety-nine year lease with an option to renew and purchase, consti-
tuted a mere security agreement for a mortgage and that the nomi-
nal lessee could therefore depreciate the property.221 Without
hesitation, the Court determined economic reality by looking to
case law treating a deed executed as security for a loan as a mort-
gage for purposes of equity jurisdiction. 222
Thirty-nine years later, in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 223 the
Court experienced far greater difficulty in determining the economic
reality underlying another sale-leaseback transaction and held that
the lessor could depreciate the property. Although inquiring into
the "objective economic realities" of the transaction, the Court con-
ceded that there was "no simple device available to peel away the
form of this transaction and to reveal its substance. ' '224 Acknowl-
edging "the reality that the tax laws affect the shape of nearly every
business transaction, ' 225 the Court did not make state law control-
219 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (1938) (granting right to intervene to a person who
would be bound by the judgment or adversely affected by the disposition of property
within the control of court) with FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (1966) (granting right to inter-
vene to any person claiming "an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action" if the person "is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest"). See
generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 400-07 (1967) (describing
changes in the 1966 amendments); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note
218, § 1903 (same). See also Shapiro, Some Thoughts On Intervention Before Courts,
Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 721-22 (1968) (describing broadened
rights of intervention).
220 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
221 Id. at 255.
222 Id. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
223 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
22 4 Id. at 576.
22 5 Id. at 580.
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ling on the issue of ownership, but instead looked to whether the
lessor retained "significant and genuine attributes of traditional les-
sor status.1
226
Uneasy about economic reality, the Court considered the overall
tax effect of the transaction on all parties. It was:
not inappropriate to note that the Government is likely to lose
little revenue, if any, as a result of the shape given the transaction
by the parties. No deduction was created that is not either
matched by an item of income or that would not have been avail-
able to one of the parties if the transaction had been arranged
differently.227
The Court also emphasized "the absence of any differential in tax
rates and of special tax circumstances for one of the parties, 228
which would reduce the total tax collected as a result of the transac-
tion. Accordingly, the Court gave the taxpayer the benefit of the
form. Although Frank Lyon did not involve a taxpayer challenge
to form, it demonstrated the extent to which courts backed away
from economic reality and toward a transactional approach.
B. Reliance on Formal Interpretation and the One- Way Rule in
Transactions Between Unrelated Parties
Frank Lyon merely expressed a preference for respecting form
and for considering the overall taxation of all parties to the transac-
tion. From 1960 to 1990, jurists went beyond merely expressing a
preference and instead adopted formal rules designed to assure con-
sistent treatment of the transaction.
One of these formal rules simply made form determinative.229
This rule ignored the effect upon the fisc and the possibility that
form might not coincide with economic reality. The other formal
rule was the one-way rule. This rule recognized the effect of formal
rules on the fisc and the potential need to resort to economic reality
in the future. Rather than engaging in an independent inquiry to
determine the effect of the transfer upon the fisc, courts relied on
226 Id. at 584.
227 Id. at 580.
228 Id. at 583. For discussion of whether bracket differential in fact existed in Frank
Lyon, see Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of Judicial Pro-
cess, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1094-98 (1981).
229 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-1(a)(5) (1990) ("In general, if a buyer and seller
have adverse interests as to the allocation, . . . any arm's length agreement between the
buyer and the seller will establish the allocation."); Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(1) (1990)
("Generally, the valuation placed by the partners upon a partner's interest in partner-
ship property in an arm's length agreement will be regarded as correct.").
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the Commissioner, as protector of the revenues and principal benefi-
ciary of substantive interpretation, to raise the issue.
Thus, in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, courts increasingly applied
the one-way rule in unrelated-party situations. Thus, the rules of
Lazarus and Landa, which allowed taxpayers engaging in transac-
tions with unrelated persons an unrestricted right to challenge
form, and which had enjoyed broad support since the 1940s and
1950s, were suddenly challenged.23°
1. Allocating Purchase Price to a Covenant Not to Compete
Formal interpretation first emerged with respect to the allocation
of purchase price to a covenant not to compete entered pursuant to
a sale of a business.231 Such a covenant may lack commercial pur-
pose,232 and determining the economic reality underlying such a
covenant poses troubling factual issues. First, it is often uncertain
whether a covenant is an asset "distinct and severable" from the
underlying business.233 Even if it is, valuing such a covenant can be
very difficult because noncompetitive covenants are not freely
traded and are seldom valued for other purposes.2 34 Given these
230 Compare Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939) (one-way rule
not applied to sale-leaseback transaction) with Coleman v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 178
(1986) (one-way rule applied to sale-leaseback transaction), aff'd, 833 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.
1987); compare also Landa v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (taxpayer
allowed to appeal to substance of divorce settlement) with Schatten v. United States,
746 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1984) (taxpayer bound to form of divorce settlement agreement).
231 The tax law requires that sales price be allocated to assets sold together in accord-
ance with their fair market values. See Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.
1945); Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-5 (1991) (Where the taxpayer acquires nondepreciable and
depreciable property for a lump sum, "the basis for depreciation cannot exceed an
amount which bears the same proportion to the lump sum as the value of the deprecia-
ble property at the time of acquisition bears to the value of the entire property at that
time."); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-1(a)(5), 1.1250-1(a)(i)(b) (1990); Rev. Rul. 55-79, 1955-1
C.B. 370 (a sale of a business is a sale of the assets comprising the business, and the sale
price must be allocated to the assets in accordance with their fair market values). See
generally Bogdanski, Contractual Allocations of Price in Sales of Businesses, 15 J. CORP.
TAX'N 99 (1988).
23 2 See Rosen, supra note 3, at 739 (describing a noncompetition provision as "essen-
tially meaningless").
233 See 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 61, § 23A.93, at 222 ("Where ... a covenant not to
compete is nonseverable from a transfer of goodwill in the sale of a going concern, the
covenant is not subject to depreciation even though the parties place a separate value on
it.") (footnote omitted); Beghe, Income Tax Treatment of Covenants Not to Compete,
Consulting Agreements and Transfers of Goodwill, 30 TAX LAW. 587, 589 (1977) (dis-
cussing severability test); Comment, Tax Treatment of a Covenant Not to Compete, 8
STAN. L. REV. 485, 488 (1956).
234See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 85 (3d Cir.) ("[OCnly the
parties to [a covenant not to compete] could value it; there exists no outside valuation
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difficulties, the contract price was a reasonable surrogate for eco-
nomic reality.
Moreover, a covenant not to compete posed an attractive case for
applying the transactional approach. The tax consequences of the
covenant to the buyer and seller are roughly offsetting: allocations
to the covenant increase the buyer's basis in an amortizable asset,
while allocations away from the covenant maximize the benefit of
the seller's capital gains preference. The size of the transaction and
the sophistication of the parties made substantial negotiation over
the contract allocations likely.
(a) Additional Weight Given Form: The Strong Proof Rule
In two lines of cases emerging after 1950, courts replaced eco-
nomic reality with formal interpretation. The first line adopted the
"strong proof" rule, which deemed the price specified in the con-
tract to be correct, absent "strong proof" to the contrary.235 Ini-
tially, courts defended this rule as a means of determining the
economic reality of the transaction. In the case credited with
originating the strong proof rule, Hamlin's Trust v. Commis-
sioner,236 the Tenth Circuit conceded that the sellers did not con-
sider the tax consequences of their contract but nonetheless held
them to the allocation contained in it: "Having thus agreed, the
taxpayers are not at liberty to say that such was not the substance
and reality of the transaction. ' 237 Unfortunately, the court did not
explain why the agreement was the substance and reality of the
transaction.
The explanation came in Ullman v. Commissioner,238 in which
the Second Circuit appealed to the adverse tax interests of buyer
and seller: the seller typically wishes to allocate a low value to the
covenant so as to maximize his capital gain, while the buyer wants
to allocate a high value to the covenant so as to increase his amorti-
index."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 55
(9th Cir. 1961) (referring to the "impossible task of assigning fair values to good will
and to covenants").
235 See Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[W]hen the
parties to a transaction ... have specifically set out the covenants in the contract and
have there given them an assigned value, strong proof must be adduced by them in
order to overcome that declaration.").
236 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954).
237 Id. at 765; see also Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d
355, 357 (7th Cir. 1955) (citing Hamlin's Trust for the proposition that tax conse-
quences are determined by looking to realities).
238 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959).
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zation deduction. Thus, the court concluded, "The tax avoidance
desires of the buyer and seller... are ordinarily antithetical, forcing
them, in most cases, to agree upon a treatment which reflects the
parties' true intent with reference to the covenants, and the true
value of them in money. 239
While not completely abandoning economic reality, the strong
proof rule constituted a significant step away from it. The contract
allocation may not reflect the economic reality behind the transac-
tion, but rather the parties' relative knowledge or bargaining power.
As in Hamlin's Trust, a party may be unaware of the covenant's tax
consequences and fail to bargain with respect to it. Alternatively,
the contract allocation may be set to minimize the overall tax liabil-
ity of both parties.2" The emphasis in Ullman on the offsetting
effects of the capital gain preference and the amortization deduc-
tion, and its neglect of potential state law consequences, 2 1 suggest a
shift from economic reality toward a transactional approach. The
attenuated relationship of the strong proof rule to economic reality
became more evident in later decisions, which only defend the rule
as not respecting "obviously substanceless allocations. 242
While moving toward a formal rule, the strong proof cases also
gravitate toward the one-way rule. Some cases suggest that the
Commissioner may be bound by the price contained in the con-
tract.243 Other cases, however, recognize the Commissioner's right
239 Id. at 308. See Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1961) ("Gener-
ally speaking, the countervailing tax considerations upon each taxpayer should tend to
limit schemes or forms which have no basis in economic fact."). For commentary on
Ullman, see Note, Tax Treatment of Covenants Not to Compete: A Problem of Purchase
Price Allocation, 67 YALE L.J. 1261 (1958).
240 See 1 B. BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 3, 4.4.4.
241 The amount allocated to the covenant might, for instance, affect the recovery al-
lowed for the breach of a covenant not to compete.
242 See Lazisky v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 495, 501-02 (1979) ("Our test is designed
to (1) produce predictability (and therefore reduce litigation) by generally enforcing
agreements as made, and (2) assure at the same time that the Court is not hamstrung
into enforcing obviously substanceless allocations.").
243 See, e.g., Patterson v. Commissioner, 810 F.2d 562, 571 (6th Cir. 1987) (alloca-
tion to covenant not to compete given effect "absent a clear indication that such alloca-
tion is totally contrary to economic reality"); Theophelis v. United States, 751 F.2d 165,
167 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Generally, the amount allocated by the parties' agreement [to a
seller's covenant not to compete] is controlling, because they have competing and con-
flicting tax interests."); Schulz, 294 F.2d at 55 ("The Commissioner should be slow in
going beyond the values which the taxpayers state .. "); Schmitz v. Commissioner, 51
T.C. 306, 317 (1968) (refusing to distinguish challenges by the Commissioner from
those by the taxpayer), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1972).
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to look beyond form.2
(b) Form Binding Unless Unenforceable: Commissioner v.
Danielson
The second line of cases sprung from the Third Circuit opinion in
Commissioner v. Danielson,245 which went beyond the evidentiary
"strong proof" rule and bound the taxpayer to the price stated in
the sales contract, absent proof that would be admissible in a state
court to alter the construction of the contract or to show its unen-
forceability.246 By limiting the circumstances in which the taxpayer
could challenge the form of the transaction, Danielson expressly
adopted a formal rule that made no pretense of determining eco-
nomic reality. Indeed, the court acknowledged that the covenant
lacked the value stated in the contract and that the amount allo-
244See Dixie Fin. Co. v. United States, 474 F.2d 501, 504-05 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The
parties cannot contractually preclude the Commissioner from attacking an allocation
that has no basis in economic reality... [but] the taxpayer must generally accept the
tax consequences which follow from the form he has chosen."); Copperhead Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 272 F.2d 45, 48 (6th Cir. 1959) (citing Hamlin's Trust for the proposi-
tion that "[tihe Tax Court is not bound by the allocation of values made in the purchase
contract, and is free to increase or decrease the amounts so allocated in accordance with
the facts"); Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 446 (1980)
(refusing to apply the "strong proof" rule to challenges by the Commissioner); Zer-
opack Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 40,566 (Oct. 27, 1983), aff'd by order,
(4th Cir. 1985) (same).
245 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967). For commentary on
Danielson, see Comment, Federal Income Taxation - Covenant Not to Compete -
Right of Taxpayer to Contradict Terms of Sales Contract, 53 IOWA L. REV. 963 (1968);
Note, Income Tax, 46 TEX. L. REV. 108 (1967); Note, Judicial Treatment of Covenants
Not to Compete: The Third Circuit Takes a Giant Step, 24 TAX L. REV. 513 (1969);
Note, The Danielson Rule: An Anodyne for the Pain of Reasoning, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1320 (1989).
246 Danielson, 378 F.2d at 775 (A party to a contract allocating a portion of the
purchase price to a convenant not to compete may "challenge the tax consequences of
his agreement as construed by the Commissioner only by adducing proof which in an
action between the parties to the agreement would be admissible to alter that construc-
tion or to show its unenforceability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress,
etc.").
Curiously, courts embraced the parol evidence rule in taxation while backing away
from it in contract law. See Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized
Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342,
1342-53 (1975) (describing recent erosion of the parol evidence rule); Sweet, Contract
Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 1036 (1968); Wallach, The Declining 'Sanctity' of Written Contracts - Impact of
the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence Rule, 44 Mo. L. REV. 651 (1979).
The decline of the rule in contract law was part of a larger movement away from for-
malism in contract law. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1974).
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cated to it was actually paid for other assets. 47 The court defended
its rule by noting that the "taxpayers have it within their own con-
trol to choose in the first place whatever arrangements they care to
make. , 24 8
In adopting its formal rule, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the Com-
missioner's right to challenge the form of the transaction.24 9 The
court expected such challenges "where a loss of tax revenues from
one taxpayer cannot be retrieved entirely from another because of
differentials in tax brackets or other factors ....
By drawing closer both to a formal approach and to the one-way
rule, Danielson represented the next logical step in the journey that
Hamlin's Trust and Ullman began. Whereas Ullman bound the
taxpayer subject to a showing of strong proof, Danielson bound him
subject to a showing of mistake, undue influence, duress, or fraud.
From 1967 to 1980, however, the Danielson rule remained basically
an anomaly, applied by one circuit to the single issue of the alloca-
tion of purchase price to a covenant not to compete.251
2. Extension of Dispositive One- Way Rule Beyond Covenants Not
To Compete
In the 1980s, jurists became increasingly wary of determining
economic reality and moved closer to formal interpretation of tax
law. The proliferation of tax benefits unrelated to the measurement
of income, such as the investment tax credit 252 and accelerated de-
preciation, 253 may have fueled this skepticism. Such benefits are in-
centives, intended to be allocated by private negotiation.254 The tax
247 Danielson, 378 F.2d at 774.
24 8 Id. at 775.
249 Where the Commissioner attacks the formal agreement the court involved is
required to examine the 'substance' and not merely the 'form' of the transac-
tion. This is so for the very good reason that the legitimate operation of the
tax laws is not to be frustrated by forced adherence to the mere form in which
parties may choose to reflect their transaction.
Id. at 774.25 0 Id. at 778.
251 For an isolated extension of Danielson, see Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 445
F.2d 1020, 1022 (2d Cir. 1971) (applying strong proof rule in determining value of
mortgage).
252 The investment tax credit was enacted in 1962. See Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 963, § 2(b) (1962).
253 The accelerated cost recovery system was enacted in 1981. See The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, § 201(a) (1981).
25 4 See, for example, the provision regarding safe-harbor leasing enacted in 1981 and
codified at I.R.C. § 168(0(8) (1981). That provision was intended to permit loss corpo-
rations the full benefit of accelerated depreciation by transferring ownership in prop-
OREGON LAW REVIEW
shelters sometimes resulting from such negotiations lack an eco-
nomic reality apart from their tax consequences. Inundated by a
flood of tax shelter cases, courts seized upon the one-way rule as a
means of reducing their docket. In part, this meant strengthening
that rule. Thus, four circuit courts of appeals replaced the strong
proof rule with the more stringent Danielson rule.2 55
This also meant extending the strong proof and Danielson rules
to a wide array of issues other than the allocation of purchase price
to covenants not to compete. Some extensions were straight for-
ward. For example, the preference for flexibility expressed in
Subchapter K made it easy for the Fifth Circuit, in Spector v. Com-
missioner,256 to adopt the Danielson rule in deciding whether a re-
demption of a partnership interest constituted a "sale"2"" or
"liquidation, 25 8 an issue which the court found lacking in eco-
nomic reality.259 Likewise, the careful bargaining involved in most
business acquisitions made it natural to extend the strong proof and
Danielson rules to allocations of purchase price to assets other than
covenants not to compete, notwithstanding the easier severability
and valuation issues posed by such assets.2"
Other extensions of the strong proof and Danielson rules during
phase three did not flow naturally from prior law. Courts applied
the rules to many characterization issues not involving allocations
and for which the statute did not contemplate a transactional ap-
proach. Courts used the rules when distinguishing between option
payments and interest,26' royalties and compensation,262 sales and
erty. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., lST SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX Acr OF 1981, at 103
(Comm. Print 1981).255 See Schatten v. United States, 746 F.2d 319, 321-22 (6th Cir. 1984); Bradley v.
United States, 730 F.2d 718, 720 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984); Spector
v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 376, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981); For-
ward Communications Corp. v. United States, 608 F.2d 485, 490 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
256 641 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981).
257 I.R.C. § 741 (1991).
258 I.R.C. § 736 (1991).
259 Spector, 641 F.2d at 384 ("[O]nce the parties have agreed to structure the transac-
tion in such a way as to comply with [statutory] requirement[s], 'economic reality' does
not provide a ground upon which that form can be set aside.").
260See Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1980) (Danielson rule
applied to the allocation between lease and land); Dakan v. United States, 492 F.2d
1192, 1199 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (applying Danielson rule to allocation between capital and
noncapital items).
261 See Bradley v. United States, 730 F.2d 718, 720 (1 1th Cir.) (Danielson rule ap-
plied to determine whether amounts paid for a transfer of real estate constituted pay-
ments for a continuing option or interest income), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984).
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options, 2 6 3 and in making many other determinations.2 64
The most striking expansion of the one-way rule during the 1980s
occurred for two issues on which courts had traditionally permitted
the taxpayer to appeal to form. The first issue was the allocation of
amounts paid under a divorce settlement agreement. Since Landa
y 265hav. Commissioner, courts had allowed taxpayers to appeal to the
substance of such allocations.266 Initially, courts expressed reluc-
tance to apply the Danielson rule to settlement agreements because
they are entered into by relatively unsophisticated persons who are
likely to be under duress.267 Nonetheless, in 1984 the Sixth Circuit
applied the one-way rule to such transactions. 26
The second issue was the effect of a sale-leaseback transaction on
entitlement to the depreciation deduction. A series of cases re-
placed Lazarus' two-way rule2 69 with the one-way rule. First, the
Seventh Circuit, in Comdisco, Inc. v. United States,27° cast a cloud
over Lazarus by discussing the Danielson rule in the context of de-
termining ownership of property for tax purposes.27 '
Later, in Coleman v. Commissioner,272 the Tax Court went fur-
ther. Acknowledging Lazarus, the court nonetheless appealed to
the one-way rule to determine ownership of property for deprecia-
tion purposes: "We think it important to note that . . .it is the
262 See Rothstein v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 488, 495 (1988) (applying the strong
proof rule to determine whether the proceeds from the sale of a business constituted
royalties or compensation).
2 6 3 See Elrod v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1046, 1064-66 (1986) (discussion of strong
proof and Danielson rules in distinguishing sale from option).
264 See, e.g., Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 405, 426-27
(1988) (one-way rule applied to a resale/refinance transaction), aff'd, 896 F.2d 580
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1619 (1991); Illinois Power Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 87 T.C. 1417, 1430-32 (1986) (Danielson rule applied in characterizing corporate
gift; form of the transfer respected); Miami Purchasing Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 76
T.C. 818, 830 (1981) (strong proof rule applied in determining where title passed in the
sale and export of domestically produced goods); Franks v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M.
(CCH) 4,819 (1988) (applying the Danielson rule in determining whether amounts
stated in sublease were income).
265 206 F.2d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
266 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
267 See, e.g., Weiner v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 155, 160 (1973) (Danielson rule not
applied to divorce settlement agreements).
268 See Schatten v. United States, 746 F.2d 319, 321-22 (6th Cir. 1984) (Danielson
applied to divorce settlements).2 69 See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
270 756 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1985).
271 Id. at 578. The court rejected the Danielson rule because the formalities required
for the investment tax credit precluded inconsistent taxpayer positions. Id.
272 87 T.C. 178 (1986).
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taxpayer and not the Government which seeks to disavow the form
of the transaction.... Although [Lazarus] ostensibly stands for the
proposition that a taxpayer can attack the form of a transaction
which encompasses the passage of title, there were various other
factors present in that case. "273 Later that term, the Tax Court
again applied the strong proof rule to a sale-leaseback
transaction.274
C. Bargain and Whipsaw as Rationales for the One- Way Rule
Under phase three, the rationales offered for the one-way rule
reflected diminished faith in economic reality and movement to-
ward a transactional approach. Emphasis on the transaction made
the tax treatment of the parties interdependent and gave the IRS a
stake in the arrangement.
Accordingly, during phase three, the favored volitional rationale
for the rule was bargain. The agreement among private persons it-
self became a basis for taxation. Courts defended the strong proof
rule as enforcing "agreements as made" 27 and as preventing "judi-
cial alteration of a contract. ' 276 Danielson defended its rule as a
means of enforcing private contracts:
[T]he determination as to whether a covenant not to compete
was actually executed is important, taxwise, both to the buyer
and the seller. A tax challenge aside, the amount a buyer pays a
seller for such a covenant, entered into in connection with a sale
of a business, is ordinary income to the covenantor and an amor-
tizable item for the covenantee. Indeed, the presumed tax conse-
quences of the transaction may, as here, help to determine the
total amount a purchaser is willing to pay for such a purchase.
Therefore, to permit a party to an agreement fixing an explicit
amount for the covenant not to compete to attack that provision
for tax purposes, absent proof of the type which would negate it
in an action between the parties, would be in effect to grant, at
the instance of a party, a unilateral reformation of the contract
with a resulting unjust enrichment. If allowed, such an attack
would encourage parties unjustifiably to risk litigation after con-
summation of a transaction in order to avoid the tax conse-
quences of their agreements. And to go behind the agreement at
the behest of a party may also permit a party to an admittedly
273 1d. at 201-03.
274 See Illinois Power Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1417, 1432-35 (1986).
275 See supra note 242.
276 See Major v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 239, 247-48 (1981) (The strong proof rule is
"necessitated by a general desire to instill a degree of predictability into this area of the
law, as well as to guard against a flood of frivolous litigation in cases where one party
seeks to obtain a judicial alteration of a contract ....").
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valid agreement to use the tax laws to obtain relief from an unfa-
vorable agreement.
Of vital importance, such attacks would nullify the reasonably
predictable tax consequences of the agreement to the other party
thereto. Here the buyer would be forced to defend the agreement
in order to amortize the amount allocated to the covenant. If
unsuccessful, the buyer would lose a tax advantage it had paid
the selling-taxpayers to acquire. In the future buyers would be
unwilling to pay sellers for tax savings so unlikely to
materialize.2
77
By allowing the taxpayer to challenge the allocation of purchase
price to a covenant not to compete only when he could also prove
the covenant unenforceable, the Third Circuit essentially made the
tax consequences of the allocation a matter of contract law. By al-
lowing the IRS to invoke the parol evidence rule, Danielson virtu-
ally made the IRS a party to the contract.
Movement toward a transactional approach was also evident in
the systemic rationale offered for the one-way rule. Focus on the
transaction carried with it the corollary of consistent treatment.
Thus, although the early strong proof cases did not make a systemic
argument, one was eventually offered in Danielson, which empha-
sized the need to avoid whipsaw of the government:
[Allowing taxpayers to attack the allocations set forth in
agreements] would cause the Commissioner considerable
problems in the collection of taxes. The Commissioner would
not be able to accept taxpayers' agreements at face value. He
would be confronted with the necessity for litigation against both
buyer and seller in order to collect taxes properly due. This is so
because when the Commissioner tries to collect taxes from one
party he may, as here, dispute the economic reality of his agree-
ment. When the Commissioner turns to the other party, there
will likely be the arguments that the first party, as here, received
consideration for bearing the tax burden resulting from the sale
and that the covenants did indeed have economic reality.
278
Although a latecomer, whipsaw eventually became the "most
persuasive ' 271 of the rationales for the one-way rule during phase
three.
277 Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
858 (1967) (citation omitted).
27 8 Id.
279 Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1004 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Harvey
Radio Lab., Inc. v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 118, 120 (1st Cir. 1972) (emphasis on whip-
saw and certainty as rationales for the strong proof rule).
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PART THREE
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE ONE-WAY RULE
I
THE ONE-WAY RULE AS COMPROMISE
The present status of the one-way rule can be understood by con-
sidering the continuum between formal and substantive interpreta-
tion. As discussed above, formal interpretation looks only to the
literal language of the statute or contract, while substantive inter-
pretation permits departure from the language when necessary to
reach a just result.280 The one-way rule occupies an intermediate
position on the continuum by adopting a formal interpretation in
the immediate case while preserving the possibility of substantive
interpretation in the future. On either side of the one-way rule lies a
more formal alternative, making form determinative; 28 ' and a more
substantive alternative, appeal to economic reality.282 Thus the
one-way rule compromises between these alternatives.
CHART TWO
Formal Substantive
Interpretation Interpretation
Making One-Way Economic
Form Rule Reality
Determinative
II
THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE ONE-WAY RULE
IN THE FACE OF COMPETING
ALTERNATIVES
As a compromise, the one-way rule competes with each of its
alternatives. The rule recedes if economic reality or making form
determinative become more attractive. Recent developments sug-
gest that although economic reality and making form determinative
may both be gaining in popularity, they are unlikely to eclipse the
one-way rule.
280 See supra Part One I.C.
281 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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A. Economic Reality
The traditional approach taxes individuals according to economic
reality.283 The prolific tax legislation of the 1980s may well revive
faith in this approach. In many respects, the Economic Recovery
Act of 1981,24 the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982,285 the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,286 the Tax Reform Act
of 1986,287 and others,288 reduced tax considerations in business
planning. First, rate reductions in 1981289 and 198629 decreased
the marginal importance of taxes in overall profit. Second, the new
laws curtailed tax preferences that diverge from economic income.
Some, such as the investment tax credit, were repealed.291 Others,
such as accelerated depreciation, were limited selectively through
the passive loss rules2 92 and a strengthened minimum tax. 293 Fi-
nally, repealing safe-harbor leasing294 and restricting partnership
flexibility2 95 curbed taxpayers' ability to allocate tax liability inter
se.
These legislative changes may encourage courts to inquire into
economic reality with renewed vigor. The reduced importance of
tax incentives and of taxes generally should make courts more confi-
dent that commercial practice properly characterizes the parties' re-
lationship. No longer crushed under a backlog of tax shelter
cases, 296 courts have more leisure for extended analysis. Less often
2 8 3 See supra Part One I.C.
2 84 ERTA, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
2 8 5 The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-
248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
286 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494
(1984).
287 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
288 See, e.g., the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203,
101 Stat. 1330 (1987); the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988); the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989).
289 ERTA § 101.
290 Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 101.
29 1 Id. §§ 201-04, 211-13.
29 2 Id. §§ 501-02 (codified at I.R.C. § 469 (1991)).
29 3 Id. §§ 701-02 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 53, 55-59 (1991)).
294 TEFRA §§ 208-10 (repealing I.R.C. § 168(0(8)).
295 See DEFRA §§ 71-79.
29 6 See 1989 I.R.S. ANN. REP. 60 (listing the number of refund suits and tax court
cases pending in 1988 and 1989); 1988 I.R.S. ANN. REP., 35, 38-39 (listing the number
of refund suits and tax court cases pending in 1987 and 1988); see also Tax Report, Wall
Street J., August 22, 1990, at 1, col. 5 (describing 38% decline in Tax Court docket
from 1986 to 1990).
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required to defer to the parties' arrangement, courts will feel freer to
delve into economic reality.
Notwithstanding its possible resurgence, the doctrine of eco-
nomic reality seems unlikely to eclipse the one-way rule. Two
premises underlie the one-way rule: a persistent skepticism about
the existence of an independent economic reality29 7 and a willing-
ness to regard the parties' agreement as the touchstone of taxa-
tion.298 These premises derive from basic perceptions that do not
quickly fade and that mere legislation cannot alter.
This fact is evident in the history of the rule. Doubt regarding
the economic reality underlying related-party sales dates from the
1940s and seems firmly entrenched. 299 Doubt with respect to other
related-party transactions, while weaker, arose in the 1950s. 3" The
movement from economic reality to transactional consistency evi-
dent in phase three30 predates the tax shelters of the early 1980s
and cannot be stemmed by legislative fiat.
B. Making Form Determinative
The formalist alternative to the one-way rule is the rule making
form determinitive for both taxpayer and government. As did the
one-way rule, this rule gained ground during phase three. a 2
The rule making form determinative responds to the premises un-
derlying the one-way rule. Like the one-way rule, the rule making
form determinative resolves doubt regarding economic reality in a
way that provides certainty. Also like the one-way rule, the rule
making form determinative adopts the transactional approach to
taxation by effectively making the government a party to the
transaction.
In contrast to the one-way rule, the rule making form determina-
tive responds to the premises underlying the one-way rule so as to
favor taxpayers. This alternative provides taxpayers, but not the
government, with certainty. It allows taxpayers to allocate tax bur-
den among themselves and assures them that the government can-
not challenge the allocation. The rule making form determinative
construes the statute contra proferentem ,303 against the preference
297 See supra Part One I.D.
298 See supra Part Two IV.A.2.
299 See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 142-68 and accompanying text.
301 See supra Part Two IV.A.
302 See supra notes 223-28, 243 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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of its author, the government.
In an era in which many advocate strictly construing constitu-
tions and statutes,3" the rule making form determinative may well
gain popularity. Its appeal extends to Congress as well. In 1984,
for example, Congress adopted a formal rule by making the
designation of the parties determinative in distinguishing alimony
from maintenance payments.3 °0 Less directly, the enactment of de-
tailed schemes that lack commercial analogues, such as the passive
loss rules,3" may be read as presuming formal interpretation.30 7
However, it is unlikely that the rule making form determinative
will ever completely subsume the one-way rule. Interpretative rules
tend to be balanced, reflecting their use in a wide array of circum-
stances.3 °8 Thus, to the extent courts back away from economic
reality, they will likely embrace both the rule making form determi-
native and the one-way rule. Indeed, recent tax legislation has reaf-
firmed and extended the Danielson 3' and strong proof310 rules for
allocating purchase price among business assets.3 1'
304 See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-51 (1983)
(arguing for strict construction); Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative
History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court,
39 AM. U.L. REV. 277, 281, 298 (1990) (describing a rise in the textualist approach to
statutory construction).
305 DEFRA § 422 (codified at I.R.C. § 71 (1991)). See generally Comment, 1984
Deficit Reduction Act: Divorce Taxation, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 177.
306 [.R.C. § 469 (1991).
307 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, tax shelters were carefully analyzed for lack
of a profit motive. See, e.g., Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386, 414-15 (1987), aff'd,
368 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989). The enactment of the passive loss rules could be under-
stood as undermining such substantive approaches.
308 Blatt, supra note 29, at 844. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (setting forth conflicting maxims of interpretation).
309 See supra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
310See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
311 The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reaffirmed the Danielson
and strong proof rules. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG.,
IST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 355
(Comm. Print 1987) (citing Ullman and Danielson); id. at 359 (acknowledging intent
not to restrict IRS challenges to the value of assets).
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 extended the Danielson rule to certain
other allocations of purchase price. See I.R.C. § 1060(a) (1991) ("If in connection with
an applicable asset acquisition, the transferee and transferor agree in writing as to the
allocation of any consideration, or as to the fair market value of any of the assets, such
agreement shall be binding on both the transferee and transferor unless the Secretary
determines that such allocation (or fair market value) is not appropriate"); HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
WAYS AND MEANS DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE, 79 (Comm. Print 1990) (describing
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III
DIVISIONS WITHIN THE COMPROMISE
Assuming the one-way rule retains vitality, questions remain as
to when and how courts will apply the rule. The compromise im-
plicit in the one-way rule is not monolithic, but rather is based on
the two premises discussed above: doubt regarding the existence of
economic reality, and a willingness to make the transaction the
touchstone for taxation. Although these premises were joined dur-
ing phase three,3"' they are logically distinct and support different
formulations of the one-way rule.
The case law recognizes this divergence. In Strick Corp. v.
United States,313 the Third Circuit rejected the Danielson rule in
determining the excise tax due on sales among related parties be-
cause of the lack of adverse tax interests.3 4 Nonetheless, the court
bound the taxpayer to its form, presumably because of the doubtful
economic reality of the transaction. 31 5 Conversely, in Peerless Steel
Equipment Co. v. Commissioner,31 6 the Tax Court refused to bind a
corporation to the form of its transaction with its profit sharing
plan, but nonetheless applied the strong proof rule.317
A. Rule Based on Doubt Regarding the Existence
of Economic Reality
Courts viewing doubt regarding the existence of economic reality
as the governing premise would apply the one-way rule whenever
they have difficulty finding a standard by which to judge such real-
ity. Under this premise, the rule receives heavy or light weight de-
pending on the perceived level of difficulty. Conversely, a clear
economic reality renders the rule inapplicable.
Courts adopting this premise generally equate economic reality
with the practices of unrelated parties. If the parties are related,
these courts attempt to construct economic reality from other bod-
ies of law or from the statutory scheme. Some cases are resolved
easily under this premise. Related-party transactions that Congress
provision as adopting the standards set forth in Danielson); H.R. REP. No. 101-964,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1096 (1990) (same).3 12 See supra Part Two IV.A.
313 714 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984).
3 14 Id. at 1206.315 Id.
316 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 880 (1967).
317 Id. at 883-84.
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identified as lacking in economic reality318 present the strongest
case for applying the one-way rule. Conversely, arm's-length trans-
actions provide the weakest case.
Other cases prove more difficult. Disagreement about the eco-
nomic reality behind a "redemption," as defined in the Code,319
may explain the difference between Ciaio v. Commissioner32 and
Television Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner.32' Likewise, uncer-
tainty over the weight to be attached to state law analogues for cor-
porate existence may be at the heart of the disagreement between
Shaw v. Commissioner 322 and Bolger v. Commissioner.323
B. Rule Based on Willingness to Make the Transaction
the Focus of Taxation
In contrast, courts viewing the transactional approach to taxation
as the guiding premise would find the core application of the one-
way rule in unrelated-party transactions. By replacing taxation of
individuals in accordance with economic reality with consistent tax-
ation of the transaction, the transactional approach sanctions taxa-
tion contrary to an existing economic reality even if the means for
determining such reality are clear. Namely, in relying on the con-
tract price, both Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner 324 and Commis-
sioner v. Danielson 325 consciously departed from fair market
value. 326
The transactional approach is based on two separate theories.
The broader theory holds that the parties should determine among
themselves the tax consequences of their transactions. Under this
theory, the one-way rule applies whenever the parties have adverse
tax interests, 327 even if they cannot take inconsistent reporting posi-
tions.3 28 Thus, this theory incorporates contract law standards into
318 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267, 482 (1991).
319 I.R.C. § 317(b) (1991).
320 47 T.C. 447 (1967). See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
321 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960). See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
322 59 T.C. 375 (1972). See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
323 59 T.C. 760 (1973). See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
324 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954).
325 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967).
3 26 See supra notes 236-37, 247 and accompanying text.
3 27 See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R.R. v. United States, 443 F.2d 147, 152
(10th Cir. 1971) (refusing to apply the Danielson and strong proof rules in determining
tax treatment of bonds issued prior to 1913 because competing tax interests did not exist
prior to enactment of income tax).
328 See Harvey Radio Lab., Inc. v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 118, 120 (1st Cir. 1972)
(adopting the strong proof rule in situations not presenting the possibility for whipsaw).
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federal tax law.
Under the narrower theory, the one-way rule applies only when
the government might suffer whipsaw. The rule would not apply
under this theory if legal formalities precluded whipsaw,32 9 or if all
parties to the transaction took consistent reporting positions,330 or
were before the court.33' This theory elevates the taxpayer's burden
of proof without necessarily incorporating contract law.
Case law illustrates the divergence of the two theories. In
Schmitz v. Commissioner,332 the Tax Court refused to apply the
Danielson rule because both parties to the agreement were before
the court, but nonetheless applied the strong proof rule.333 Simi-
larly, in Illinois Power Co. v. Commissioner,33 the Tax Court, rely-
ing on the consistent reporting of the transaction, affirmatively
allowed the taxpayer to appeal to economic reality,335 while impos-
ing a strong proof standard.336
The different theories for the transactional approach suggest that
the one-way rule should receive more weight (the Danielson rule)
when the possibility of inconsistent positions exists, and less weight
(the strong proof rule) when the only reason for applying the rule is
to encourage taxpayers to allocate tax consequences inter se.
C. The Overall Effect of the Divisions
In summary, the one-way rule presently consists of two branches.
Under one branch, the one-way rule receives either preclusive or
varying weight depending on the difficulty of finding a standard for
judging economic reality.337 Under the other, the one-way rule re-
ceives either great or intermediate weight depending on the poten-
tial for whipsaw.338 Considered together, these branches clash.
Depending on the depth of the rifts between the premises, there
329 See Comdisco, Inc. v. United States, 756 F.2d 569, 578 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusing
to apply Danielson when the formal requirement for claiming investment tax credit
precluded the possibility of whipsaw).
3 30 See Campbell v. United States, 661 F.2d 209, 217 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (suggesting that
Danielson may not apply when inconsistent positions are not attributable to incompati-
ble characterizations but to different accounting methods).
331 See Freeport Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 107, 116 (1974) (refusing to
apply Danielson when both parties to the agreement are before the court).
332 51 T.C. 306 (1968).
33 3 Id. at 317-18.
334 87 T.C. 1417 (1986).
33 5 Id. at 1433 & n.13.
33 6 Id. at 1434.
337 See supra Part Three III.A.
338 See supra Part Three III.B.
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may be two one-way rules. One, premised on doubt regarding eco-
nomic reality and concerned primarily with transactions among re-
lated taxpayers, places the taxpayer at the greatest disadvantage in
challenging the character of related-party sales. The other, pre-
mised on the transactional approach and concerned with transac-
tions among unrelated taxpayers, places the taxpayer at the greatest
disadvantage when the government might be whipsawed.
These tensions may be diagrammed as follows:
CHART THREE
Related One-Way Rule Unrelated
Parties Parties
Doubt as to Existence of Economic Transactional Approach
Reality
Sales Subchapter C Bargain Whipsaw
(preclusive Corporate Existence (strong proof) (Danielson)
weight) Related Party
Transactions
(variable weight)
This description is a simplification. The rifts between the
premises may not be as deep as it suggests, and many cases fall
outside the pattern. For instance, the one-way rule sometimes
receives variable weight in cases between unrelated parties, and the
Danielson rule sometimes applies when no possibility of whipsaw
exists.
PART FOUR
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLYING THE
ONE-WAY RULE
This Part offers normative considerations for applying the one-
way rule. It first develops doctrinal guidelines for policymakers op-
erating within present law categories. These guidelines constitute a
unified approach to the one-way rule that is generally consistent
with present law.
Part Four then undertakes a broader analysis, not limited by a
doctrinal framework. By relating the rule to pervasive policy judg-
ments, this analysis identifies the effects of the one-way rule, gener-
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ates variables relevant to its adoption, and suggests alternative
approaches for achieving its effect.
I
DOCTRINAL GUIDELINES FOR ADOPTING THE
ONE-WAY RULE
Most jurists approach the one-way rule from existing doctrinal
categories. These categories, consisting of the broader choices de-
scribed in Part One, rest on two important assumptions: first, that
economic reality is a viable means of resolving the choice between
formal and substantive interpretation, and second, that the choices
between strict and liberal construction and between deference and
independent judgment are at least partially open.
These assumptions inhere in the one-way rule itself. The very
formulation of the rule implies the existence of an economic reality
to which the government could appeal were it dissatisfied with
form. Likewise, complete acceptance or complete rejection of defer-
ence and liberal construction would obviate the role of the one-way
rule.339
These two assumptions provide overarching guidelines for adopt-
ing the one-way rule. Under these guidelines, the rule should be
adopted when there is both uneasiness over economic reality and a
favorable inclination toward pro-government rules of interpreta-
tion. The formulation of the rule would depend upon the extent of
such uneasiness and inclination.
A. The Occasion for the One- Way Rule: Uneasiness Over
Economic Reality
Uneasiness over economic reality provides the occasion for the
one-way rule: courts should not consider the rule unless they feel
uneasy about determining economic reality. The history of the one-
way rule illustrates this pattern. In each phase of its development,
courts applied the rule when economic reality was least certain.340
This guideline synthesizes the two branches of the present one-
way rule. It extends the branch based on doubt over the existence
339 A system that always deferred to IRS determinations or routinely gave the tax
law its broadest possible scope would not contain the one-way rule, because these
broader principles would already assure a government victory. Conversely, the one-way
rule would be incongruous in a system that never deferred to agency determinations and
that always construed the tax law narrowly.
34 See supra notes 94-119, 139-79 and accompanying text.
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of economic reality by applying the rule when an existent economic
reality is factually difficult to determine. It contracts the branch
based on a willingness to make the transaction the focus of taxation
by giving weight to transactional consistency only if there is also
uneasiness over economic reality. 3
4
'
Despite its contraction of the phase three theory, this guideline is
nonetheless consistent with most phase three cases. Phase three
did, after all, coincide with growing doubt over economic reality.342
Even phase three cases that knowingly departed from economic re-
ality can be understood as responding to situations in which eco-
nomic reality is difficult to determine. Under this understanding,
Ullman and Danielson followed the contract allocation because of
the generic difficulty of determining both the existence, and the
value, of covenants not to compete.
1. Sources of Uneasiness
Uneasiness over economic reality has three potential sources.
One is the deviation of the Code from the Haig-Simons definition of
income.3 43 The failure of the Code to tax accretions in wealth until
realization, for example, deviates from that definition, which in-
cludes all income. ' Likewise, if one considers the individual to be
the appropriate taxable unit, imposing a separate corporate tax de-
parts from the Haig-Simons norm. 43
A second source of uneasiness springs from the absence of com-
mercial norms for the transaction. Sometimes, no norm for the
transaction can be found in other bodies of law, in the practice of
unrelated parties acting at arm's length, or in the underlying statu-
tory scheme. State law characterization may bear remote relevance
to the policy of the tax provision, for example, and the parties may
have negotiated the deal with its tax consequences in mind.
A third source of uneasiness is the factual difficulty of ascertain-
ing economic reality. Even if it exists in theory, economic reality
341 Commentators are usually critical of the notion that consistency can provide a
basis for taxation. See Wolfman, supra note 228, at 1098 (noting that the tax treatment
of the person before the court should not be affected by the treatment of persons not
before the court).
34 2 See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
34 3 See H. SIMONS, supra note 34, at 50, 61-62, 206.
344 Simons accepted this deviation as an administrative necessity. See id. at 207
(calling abandonment of realization requirement "utter folly").
345 Thus, many economists favor integration of the corporate and individual income
taxes. See generally C. MCCLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE?
(1979).
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may be difficult to ascertain. Determining fair market value, for
example, can be troublesome, regardless of whether it is required
for applying the Haig-Simons definition or interpreting the Code.
These sources can be illustrated by considering the tax treatment
of the sale of an asset. Failure to tax the annual increase in the
value of the asset gives rise to the first source of uneasiness. The
second source of uneasiness is tapped whenever it is questionable
whether the sale has occurred, such as when the transaction resem-
bles a lease. The third source of uneasiness arises when the amount
of gain recognized is uncertain because its determination depends
upon the value of rarely traded property.
2. Differing Levels of Uneasiness
In a given fact situation, different jurists will feel varying degrees
of uneasiness over economic reality. One important variable is how
one defines that reality. A purist relying on the Haig-Simons defini-
tion of income, for example, would find an inquiry into economic
reality meaningless for most transactions discussed in this Article
because they involve either realization of income or imposition of
corporate tax. Indeed, the failure of the Code to embody the Haig-
Simons standard consistently casts doubt on whether economic re-
ality exists for any transaction.3 6 In contrast, a jurist defining eco-
nomic reality by reference to commercial norms could find the
inquiry into economic reality meaningful for most transactions.
The effect of one's definition of economic reality upon the one-
way rule may be illustrated by comparing the limitation on capital
losses34 7 with the denial of losses on sales between related parties.348
The limitation on losses seems premised on uneasiness attributable
to the realization principle. Having failed to adopt accrual taxation,
it may be fair to limit losses but not gains in order to address the
problem of selective realizations. By contrast, the denial of losses
on related-party sales seems premised on the assumption that such
transfers lack commercial effect. Related parties do not behave in
an arm's-length manner because they are indifferent as to the own-
ership of property among themselves.
34 6 Once the base deviates from the Haig-Simons definition, one can never be certain
that bringing a particular type of income into the base brings the entire system closer to
the Haig-Simons ideal. This is the "theory of the second best." See A. ATKINSON & J.
STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 569-70 (1980); Bittker, A "Comprehen-
sive Tax Base"as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 983-84 (1967).
34 7 I.R.C. § 1211 (1991).
348 I.R.C. § 267 (1991).
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3. A Scale of Uneasiness
Despite inevitable differences of opinion, we may construct a
rough ranking of uneasiness by weighing various factors: the devia-
tion of the tax treatment from the Haig-Simons norm, the relation-
ship among the parties, the congressional intent, the availability of
state law analogues, and the difficulty of the factual determination.
These factors suggest that uneasiness is great for transfers of hard
to value property among commonly controlled corporations. Such
transactions occur between related parties, are not subject to ac-
crual taxation, and raise intractable factual issues. At the other ex-
treme, uneasiness seems slight for most payments of cash wages to
unrelated parties. Such payments constitute accretions in wealth
under the Haig-Simons definition, conform to common practice,
and are easily valued.
B. The Attraction of the One-Way Rule: Pro-Government Rules
of Interpretation
Uneasiness over economic reality alone does not explain adoption
of the one-way rule. Also necessary is the decision to adopt a pro-
government rule of interpretation. By escalating the burden placed
on the taxpayer, the one-way rule overtly favors the government.
This pro-government tilt indicates that the long-term shift away
from independent judgment and strict interpretation fueled the
growth of the one-way rule over the three phases. 49
The selection of the one-way rule does not necessarily imply a
decision to forego more neutral alternatives. Without recourse to
economic reality, the only alternative to a one-way rule is to make
form determinative. Although facially neutral, that approach in
practice favors the taxpayer, who controls the form. Thus, the only
question may be the direction in which to tilt an inherently uneven
playing surface.35°
The attraction of pro-government rules of interpretation varies
with context. Selective realization of losses, for example, may be
more troubling than selective realization of gains. 35' A pro-govern-
349 Given the breadth of the deference/independent judgment and the strict construc-
tion/liberal construction choices, it is not surprising that cases considering the one-way
rule seldom discuss those issues.
350 Indeed, even economic reality has a pro-government flavor to the extent that it
neutralizes the taxpayer's control of the facts.
351 Thus the special rules for losses between related parties, wash sales, and capital
losses. See I.R.C. §§ 267, 1091, 1231 (1991).
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ment rule may also become more attractive when the taxpayer exer-
cises unfettered control over form; e.g., the selection of form is
unconstrained by unrelated persons or other bodies of law.
C The Form of the Rule: Weighing Uneasiness Over Economic
Reality and the Attraction of Pro-Government Rules of
Interpretation
The exact form of the one-way rule depends on how uneasy
courts feel about economic reality. Great uneasiness justifies a dis-
positive rule; less uneasiness supports reduced weight.
The form of the one-way rule also depends upon the attraction of
pro-government rules of interpretation. Such rules may, for exam-
ple, be attractive only insofar as the taxpayer controls the facts.
Such reasoning could support binding the taxpayer to a form agreed
upon with an unrelated party only if such form did not result from
fraud or duress.
II
POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ONE-WAY RULE
The aforementioned guidelines are essentially doctrinal. They
flow from a constellation of choices already made in the legal sys-
tem. Addressed to the policymaker who reasons by analogy from
existing legal categories, they do not challenge the policy decisions
built into those categories. So confined, they do not aid one operat-
ing from a clean slate.
In order to assess the merits of the one-way rule de novo, one
must consider the policy judgments implicit in the doctrinal frame-
work. At least three such judgments deserve consideration. Logi-
cally independent, each judgment coincides with what Jack Balkin
describes as a separate axis in the law3" 2 and is associated with a
broader choice described in Part One.353 With respect to each
choice, the one-way rule constitutes a middle ground.
The first judgment involves the trade-off between formal and sub-
352See Balkin, supra note 13, at 41 n.68 (describing tax law as involving several
axes).
353 Each policy judgment constitutes an idealized effect of a legal rule that exists
independently of a particular context. A real world doctrinal choice invariably impli-
cates two or more axes. See id. at 45-62 (describing relationship among axes). Defer-
ence to the Internal Revenue Service will, for example, more often than not impose
liability. Similarly, formal interpretation usually favors the taxpayer, who structures
the transaction.
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stantive decisionmaking:354 whether a particular issue is best ad-
dressed by a formal rule or a substantive standard. This judgment
underlies the choice between formal and substantive interpretation.
Under this choice, the rule compromises between economic reality
and making form determinative.
The second policy judgment concerns the allocation of lawmak-
ing authority among competing institutions:3 5 whether (and to
what extent) a determination belongs to the judicial, executive, or
legislative branch. This judgment surfaces in the choice between
deference and independent judgment. For this choice, the one-way
rule occupies an intermediate position because it reduces the weight
attached to certain taxpayer arguments.
The third policy judgment relates to the imposition of tax liabil-
ity:356 whether a tax should be imposed as a result of a particular
transaction. This judgment arises when courts choose between
strict and liberal construction. The one-way rule constitutes a mid-
dle ground with respect to such a choice because in limited situa-
tions it broadens the statute.
Considering the relationship of these three judgments to the one-
way rule reveals its potential effects, thereby paving the way for its
ultimate evaluation. That evaluation falls beyond the scope of this
Article, however, because those effects are highly contextual and
raise empirical issues.
Notwithstanding this limitation, analyzing the relationship of the
rule to the underlying policy judgments frames issues for future res-
olution. Such analysis also identifies variables which are useful in
considering when and how to adopt the one-way rule. Finally, the
analysis suggests potential alternatives that achieve some of the
rule's effect without revisiting the broader choices.
A. The Trade-Off Between Formal and Substantive
Decisionmaking
The first policy judgment involves the trade-off between formal
and substantive decisionmaking. Formal decisionmaking restrains
official arbitrariness, conserves judicial resources, and provides cer-
tainty. Substantive decisionmaking offers precision in applying the
354 See id. at 43-45 (describing the opposition between formal and substantive
realizability).
355 See id. at 42-43 (institutional authority as a separate axis of opposition).
356 This judgment is a subset of the broader opposition between individualism and
communalism. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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tax statute.35 7
The one-way rule promises the best of both formal and substan-
tive decisionmaking. The rule restricts official arbitrariness by re-
ducing judicial discretion in cases in which the taxpayer challenges
the form of the transaction. It also conserves judicial resources by
constituting a formally realizable rule in such situations. Moreover,
it provides certainty to private actors by assuring them that other
parties to the agreement will be bound for tax purposes, thereby
lessening the likelihood of an IRS challenge. Finally, the rule pro-
vides certainty to the IRS by reducing the likelihood of inconsistent
taxpayer positions. While achieving these objectives of formal deci-
sionmaking, the one-way rule preserves the possibility of more pre-
cise substantive decisionmaking in the future.
None of these advantages is assured. Erratic application of the
one-way rule itself could well increase judicial arbitrariness, dissi-
pate judicial resources, and create uncertainty, while forfeiting the
precision of substantive decisionmaking. Even consistent applica-
tion of the rule has uncertain impact. For example, whether the
rule conserves judicial resources depends upon whether using the
rule in the immediate case outweighs the confusion that will arise in
future cases.358
The trade-off between formal and substantive decisionmaking
suggests variables useful in considering the one-way rule. One is the
need for precise results. This need for precision varies with the
availability of a fair and objective standard, i.e., economic reality.
Another variable is the need for certainty. A private actor's need
for certainty depends upon the nature of the transaction. Such need
peaks for unrelated-party transactions negotiated in expectation of
particular tax consequences.35 9 Such need diminishes when the par-
ties are related or when mistake, undue influence, fraud, or duress
render the contract unenforceable. By contrast, the Commis-
357 For further description of these trade-offs, see Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1687-
1701; Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257 (1974).
358 Unnecessary appeal to pedigree when form would control in any event wastes
judicial resources by needlessly encouraging future government challenges to form.
Thus, several commentators criticize courts for using the rule as a crutch when form
would have been determinative anyway. See Note, Anodyne, supra note 245, at 1330-
33 (criticizing invocation of Danielson when government would prevail on merits);
Smith, supra note 3, at 141-43 (distinguishing one-way rule from claim that form con-
trols for tax purposes).
359 See, for example, the description of Subchapter K contained in Foxman v. Com-
missioner, 41 T.C. 535 (1964). See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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sioner's need for certainty increases with the possibility that the
parties will successfully take inconsistent positions."
The trade-off between formal and substantive decisionmaking
suggests alternative means of providing certainty. Liberalized rules
of intervention and joinder 6 ' would, for example, eliminate whip-
saw of the government and conserve judicial resources while per-
mitting an inquiry into economic reality. Expanding the mitigation
provisions of the Code362 would have the same effect while prevent-
ing whipsaw of taxpayers. Other alternatives include imposing a
duty of consistency, which prevents a taxpayer from changing a re-
turn position,363 and adopting the tax benefit rule, which prevents a
single taxpayer from taking inconsistent positions for different
years. 364
B. Allocation of Law-Making Authority
The second policy judgment entails the allocation of law-making
authority between the IRS and the courts. This allocation depends
upon the relative advantage of judicial review-weighing the poten-
tial gain in legality and legitimacy associated with independent judi-
cial review against the low cost and technical expertise of agency
determination.3
6
36 0 As is evident in the text, certain facts have an ambiguous effect on the desirability
of the one-way rule. The presence of unrelated parties, for example, makes economic
reality potentially more meaningful while also increasing the need for certainty.
361 See Lake, supra note 216, at 885-92.
36 2 I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1991).
363 The taxpayer's duty of consistency estops the taxpayer even when the technical
elements of estoppel are absent. According to the Tax Court, this "quasi-estoppel"
applies if: "(1) the taxpayer has made a representation or reported an item for tax
purposes in one year, (2) the Commissioner has acquiesced in or relied on that fact for
that year, and (3) the taxpayer desires to change the representation, previously made, in
a later year after the statute of limitations on assessments bars adjustments for the initial
tax year." Unvert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 807, 815 (1979) (quoting Beltzer v. United
States, 495 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir. 1974)); see Alamo Nat'l Bank of San Antonio v.
Commissioner, 95 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 577 (1938).
364 I.R.C. § 111 (1991). See generally Del Cotto & Joyce, Double Benefits and Trans-
actional Consistency Under the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 TAX L. REV. 473 (1984); White,
An Essay on the Conceptual Foundations of the Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MICH. L. REV. 486
(1983).
365 See Diver, supra note 19, at 574-92; Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits ofAggres-
sive Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 522-26 (describing the bene-
fits of aggressive agency review).
The allocation of law making authority may also be influenced by judgments involv-
ing the trade-off between formal and substantive decisionmaking. If crafting precise
formal rules is more expensive than drafting substantive standards, then deference to
the Commissioner may be justified as a means of reducing drafting costs. Cf. Landes &
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The one-way rule trades off between these competing policies. It
limits the independence of judicial review by making the result de-
pendent upon the Commissioner's litigation position. The extent of
this limitation depends upon the weight given to pedigree. If tax-
payers are absolutely precluded from appealing to form, the defer-
ence to IRS position is great. If taxpayers face only a higher burden
of proof, the deference is less.
The allocation of law making authority suggests factors for ap-
plying the one-way rule. One factor is the congressional intent re-
garding the scope of review. 3 This factor probably explains why
the explicit reference to the Secretary in Code section 482367 is read
to forbid taxpayer challenges to form.
Another factor is the relative expertise of court and agency.368
The IRS has a deeper familiarity with the Code than most courts.
Thus, other things being equal, the IRS has a stronger claim to def-
erence in interpreting statutory terms of art governing corporate
distributions and adjustments than in construing concepts like sale
and lease, which have common law analogues.3 69
The policies regarding allocation of law making authority suggest
alternative means of deferring to the Commissioner. Giving weight
to IRS rulings and regulations defers to the Commissioner's inter-
pretations of law.37° Similarly, granting assessments the presump-
tion of correctness 371 and placing the burden of proof on the
taxpayer 372 defers to the Commissioner's factual findings.
Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 38-41 (1975).(arguing
that discretionary nonenforcement of over-inclusive statutes may be less costly than
more precise drafting).
36 6 Cf. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 557, 568 (1980) (according
an agency a "high degree of deference" because of congressional intent for administra-
tive decision). It is well established that Congress may preclude judicial review entirely.
See Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 454 (1979); Morris v.
Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501 (1977); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967),
overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
367 I.R.C. § 482 (1991). See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
368 Cf. Diver, supra note 19, at 589-90 (describing need for statutory harmony).
369 Although federal tax law governs the determination of whether a transaction
gives rise to a sale, such determination is made by reference to various state law con-
cepts, such as passage of title and the allocation of the burdens and benefits from the
property. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 589 (1978); text accom-
panying note 226 supra.
370 See 1 J. MERTENS, supra note 61, §§ 3.46-3.47.
371 See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
37 2 See generally, Martinez, supra note 25 (discussing policy basis for allocating bur-
den of proof in tax cases).
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C. Imposition of Tax Liability
The third policy judgment involves the imposition of tax liability.
Broadly considered, this judgment entails determining the relative
size of the private and public sectors of the economy. More nar-
rowly considered, the judgment is whether a particular person
should pay tax. From this narrow perspective, the one-way rule is
an immediate choice for the fisc. 3"
Determining whether a given person should pay tax depends in
part upon the appropriate overall level of taxation, or subsidy,
whichever the case may be. The willingness to allow a taxpayer to
appeal to substance in order to fully utilize the benefits of acceler-
ated depreciation might, for example, depend on the appropriate
level of subsidy for the industry. Just as tax benefits are restricted
to persons who materially participate in a business,3 74 so also might
such benefits be limited to persons for whom form matches sub-
stance. Weighing the merits of such a "selective" limitation re-
quires a second-best analysis.375
Another consideration in imposing tax liability is the utility of
the taxpayer's activity. Rules governing liability in unclear situa-
tions may be viewed as allocating the risk of uncertain tax conse-
quences. If the taxpayer's activity benefits society, imposing tax
when the statute is unclear may be unduly burdensome. Spreading
the cost of legal uncertainty over society at large by not imposing
liability may be more efficient. If the taxpayer's activity does not
benefit society, imposing liability becomes more appropriate.
Assessment of social utility depends largely upon defining the
"activity" being taxed. 376 Also important is the social utility of any
non-tax rule giving rise to the form. For example, the decision to
373 The effect of the one-way rule on the relative size of the public sector is unclear.
Its short-term, static effect increases receipts, but its long-term dynamic effects may be
otherwise. If generally perceived as unfair, the rule may decrease overall revenue be-
cause of the resulting noncompliance. Moreover, any increase in receipts attributable to
the rule might be lost through future compensating rate adjustments.
3 74 See the passive loss rules, I.R.C. § 469 (1991). See also JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 212
(1987) ("Congress determined that, in order for tax preferences to function as intended,
their benefit should be directed primarily to taxpayers with a substantial and bona fide
involvement in the activities to which the preferences related.").
375See Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189
(1989). Professor Shaviro concludes that "[the principal fairness and efficiency gain
that could result from selective limitations is a reduction in the quantity of tax-favored
investment." Id. at 1259-60.
376 The social benefit from a reorganization, for example, may vary considerably de-
pending on whether the underlying "activity" is in compliance with the requirements of
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disregard, for corporate tax purposes, a corporate agent formed in
order to avoid state usury laws 377 undermines those laws. Likewise,
allowing a bank that side steps regulatory restrictions on investment
in real property to benefit indirectly from depreciation deductions
on the property378 sanctions such behavior. 379
The policy judgment regarding tax liability suggests several alter-
natives to the one-way rule. Some rules address the level of subsidy.
A legislative cap on the benefit to be derived from the tax subsidy
directly addresses this issue .38  A less direct means of reducing the
subsidy is the rule construing tax exemptions narrowly.381
Other alternatives look to the utility of the taxpayer's activity. A
close cousin of the one-way rule is a test that looks to motive, by
requiring the presence of business purpose 38 2 or the absence of tax
avoidance.383 That test assists in the determination of tax liability
by distinguishing beneficial from nonbeneficial behavior. Insofar as
it constitutes an extra requirement that the taxpayer alone must sat-
isfy, such a test resembles the one-way rule.
CONCLUSION
The seemingly simple one-way rule is in fact immensely complex.
The rule has a richness that is belied by the brief, formulaic state-
ments contained in the case law. This Article explores that richness
by placing the rule in legal and historical context. Hopefully, this
exploration will result in deeper understanding.
Code section 368(a)(1), the consolidation of businesses, or the activities in which the
merging corporations are engaged. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1) (1991).
377 See Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
378 This may have been the case in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561
(1978), where the federal and state banking laws substantially restricted bank invest-
ment. Nonetheless, by paying lower rent, the bank benefitted from the depreciation
allowed the lessor. This is evidenced in the fact that the best possible return the lessor
could have expected was 6%, while the more senior creditor earned 6.75%. Id. at 567-
68.
379 More generally, allowing parties to allocate tax consequences inter se depends
upon whether a contract properly allocates those consequences. See supra note 268 and
accompanying text (noting uneven bargaining power in divorce settlements).380 See I.R.C. § 42(h) (1991) (allocation of low income housing credit by state hous-
ing agencies); I.R.C. § 146(b) (1991) (volume cap on private activity bonds).
381 See I J. MERTENS, supra note 61, § 3.33; 3A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 16,
§ 66.09.
382 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
383 See supra text accompanying notes 121-28.
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